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INTRODUCTION
Our modem international legal regime recognizes two main
classes of actors: states, characterized by territorial integrity and
political independence; and the citizens of states, who, since 1948,
have been bearers of direct rights of action in the international
realm.' This regime consolidates the experience of the individual into
the exercise of legal entitlements within the framework of the state,
and vests the political authority of a collectivity in its ability to
establish exclusive physical occupation of land (self-determination).
Where does this construction leave cross-border ethnic and/or
religious networks that are explicitly political, but that do not pursue
their agenda through either the mechanism of individual human
rights or the drive for independent territory? International law lacks
an intermediate legal form to recognize such collectivities, and
therefore does not offer the structures and concepts needed to grasp
and formally interact with them.
Indeed, how are we to understand a group of persons who make
claims on the grounds of their nationality, and ask for certain
nationally-based collective cultural or political rights, but reject the
conflation of nationality with the state and are uninterested in
territory or citizenship? Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian educator and
intellectual godfather of the Islamists and Al Qaeda, wrote that "a
Muslim has no nationality except his belief."2 He writes with disdain
about "the nationality determined by a government" or "the flag of a
country," exhorting his followers instead to "live[] [in] . . . and
defend[] ... the homeland of the Muslim," which, in fact, "is not a

piece of land."3 Similarly, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, one of the
fathers of Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy, wrote that the Jews are a "people
1. The intermediate status of "minority" has uncertain standing in
international law, which this article addresses in some depth.
2. SAYYID
QUTB,
MILESTONES
ch.
9
(1990),
available at
http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/Milestone/00000020.htm.
3. Id.; see also Sayed Khatab, Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's
Thought on Nationalism, 94 THE MUSLIM WORLD 217, 217-20 (2004) (asserting
that, in addition to his philosophical ideas, Sayyid Qutb's nationalism centers on
"religio-political" concepts, including "sovereignty," "servitude [to Allah]," and
the "universality of Islam," to provide the necessary link).
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transformed into a Nation through the Torah [the 'instructions' of the
Hebrew bible] and for the Torah .... This people had become a
nation before it possessed land and state . . . ."4 Jews following this

view do not speak the language of legal rights but that of obligations,
and they hold a collective duty "to preserve the teachings of the
Torah" above all else.' What is the political import of nationalism
institutionalized around a religious text or other "cultural" institution,
rather than territorial governing bodies? Similar questions arise in
considering a range of ethnic and/or religious groups whose internal
loyalties may supersede allegiance to any territorial states of
residence. What is the relationship between a national minority and a
transnational ethnic-religious network? What legal categories are we
to use to understand the Kurds, the Roma, or the Amish? For
example, individual Kurds have access to international legal
mechanisms that protect human rights, and the Kurdish region of
Iraq-or of Turkey or Iran-may be granted some measure of
political or cultural autonomy within the state. But, to the extent that
Kurdish linguistic or ethnic identity transcends these borders, the
only way forward on the international legal plane is to seek
statehood. Meanwhile, many of the grievances of the Kurdish people
as a whole do not translate well into individual rights claims, and the
focus on individual rights may work to obscure the systematic harm
to the collectivity and to depoliticize the group.
This article traces the legal developments and political history that
brought us to this state of confusion. It does so by telling two
separate, but interwoven, stories. First, it explores the political
potential of the cross-border network form of organization through a
detailed analysis of one network-the Alliance Israelite
Universelle-that flourished between 1860 and 1920. This particular
group utilized a far-flung network of private schools to organize its
ethnic/religious political self. This part of the article offers a
descriptive analysis of how transnational private-religious schools
can form the institutional basis of a political practice, and investigate
the complicated ways in which this political form interacted with
state governing structures across time and space.

4.

S.R. HIRSCH, THE TIMELESS TORAH: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WRITINGS OF

RABBI SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH 502 (Jacob Breuer ed., 1st ed. 1957).

5. Id. at 503.
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Second, this article examines the consolidation of the state-based
legal system at the conclusion of World War I, exploring the
processes through which statesmen, international lawyers, scholars,
and judges mobilized the language and power of the law to enshrine
the state as the only legitimate form of collectivized political power,
thereby excluding ethnic or religious networks from formal
participation in the new global system and, indeed, from the
consciousness of international law as a discipline. The two stories
merge in a surprising way, as the Alliance Isradlite Universelle,
studied in the first part of this article, paradoxically played an
important role in the lawmaking processes described in the second
part.
This article investigates, in particular, the legal category of the
"minority" as a group with special protections for the maintenance of
a separate collective cultural identity within the state frame. This
construction emerged at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of
World War I and was systematized by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the inter-war period. The structure of a
"minority" was primarily intended as a means of stabilizing the new
states of Eastern Europe, whose borders did not conform precisely to
ethnic and national distributions. After World War II, this poorly
defined legal category was largely abandoned, both in practice and in
legal scholarship, in favor of individual human rights, but it returned
to prominence in the 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet
Union and later of Yugoslavia.6 It is the closest international law has
come to establishing a legal category that might provide a
mechanism for understanding and interacting with dispersed
ethnic/religious networks as political entities, and indeed it was
initially adopted in the "Minorities Treaties"-the name given to the
6. This renewed interest in the legal structure of national and ethnic minorities
is evident in treaties such as the 1991 Draft Convention on Yugoslavia, the 1995
Dayton Agreements on Bosnia, and the 1995 European Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities. See Draft Convention of the Hague
Conference on Yugoslavia, Nov. 4, 1991, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: OFFICIAL PAPERS 13-23 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997);
Council of Europe: Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 351 (1995); General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. See generally
Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 583 (1992).
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series of post-World War I agreements that codified certain rights for
minorities-in part because of aggressive lobbying by the Alliance
Isradlite Universelle. I suggest that the way in which minorities were
brought into public international law in 1919 was hardly an
unalloyed triumph for minority interests. These treaties purposefully
denied minority groups political or legal standing in international
forums, and they undermined the de facto standing that independent
transnational political collectivities had enjoyed under international
law prior to 1919. The Minorities system was predicated on the same
assumptions underlying the territorial state system, and ultimately
was concerned primarily with those minorities that might foment a
separatist national movement or harbor loyalty to an outside state.
Because the Treaties and the Permanent Court set forth "minority" as
an autonomous cultural status placed within the state frame, which
thus veiled it from the prerogative of international law, neither the
Treaties nor the Court engaged with the possibility of cross-border
networks having an independent political stance.
The Alliance Israelite Universelle ("Alliance") is a Jewish group
that completely rejected the idea of a Jewish state and instead
explicitly sought to create a transnational network organization. 7 The
French Jewish founders of the Alliance entertained no territorial
aspirations and were virulent foes of political Zionism, the modern
Jewish movement for territorial autonomy. Instead, the Alliance
sought to wield political power through a cross-border network of
private education.' The group reached the apex of its operations and
political influence in the period between 1880 and 1920, when it
operated a vast network of Jewish schools in communities spread
across fifteen territories in three continents. A study of the Alliance
is valuable for understanding both the operation of schooling
7. See LISA MOSES LEFF, SACRED BONDS OF SOLIDARITY: THE RISE OF
JEWISH INTERNATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 157 (2006)
(providing a brief history of the organization's efforts to advance Jewish interests
internationally).
8. See Historique de l'Alliance [History of the Alliance], L'ALLIANCE
ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE, http://www.aiu.org/ecoles/templates/rt chromatophore
jl 5/images/stories/articles/PDF/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id
=55&Itemid=54 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (chronicling the "Call of the
Alliance"-the Alliance's founding text, which expresses the desire to, among
and to
other things, "create a society of young Jewish activists and idealists .
"gather all the generous hearts to fight against hatred and prejudice").
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networks and the political functions of ethnic/religious networks in
general, not only because it vividly demonstrates the way in which a
people can use private education across borders to practice a
collective political life outside statism, but also because the history
of the group is intertwined with the international legal developments
that ultimately marginalized networks and that underlie our current
state-based system of international law.
This article advances five arguments on the relationship between
states, minority networks, and international law.
First, it suggests that, under certain circumstances, the
(transnational) network, like the (territorial) state, can offer a
strategic structure for organizing the public political identity of an
ethnic-religious group. This work descriptively analyzes how the
Alliance institutionalized its political identity through its schools,
and how it supplied its members with many of the services that are
today associated only or mainly with the welfare state. These
included: (i) identifying shared interests and making centralized
decisions on the allocation and deployment of resources to meet
them (in the areas of education, medical care, economic
restructuring, food distribution, sanitation, and the like); (ii)
providing representative capacities whose legitimacy was accepted
both inside and outside the collectivity; and (iii) generating relatively
cohesive patterns of identity by means of which a community both
understands itself and presents itself to others. This type of network
is explicitly institutionalized as a political force and is stronger than a
mere ethnic or religious affinity. This article focuses on education as
a means of constructing the network identity. There is considerable
existing literature on the political nature of schooling in support of
state power; that is, state use of educational control to inculcate civil
responsibilities and to cultivate the values and loyalties necessary for
participation in the political process.' Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education identified the role of public

schools in teaching the "foundation of good citizenship" and as one
9. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (2005); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION 287 (rev. ed. 1999); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:
NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 294-316 (2001); STEPHEN
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL

DEMOCRACY 45 (2000).
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of the state's "most basic public responsibilities.""o This article
shows how, in a similar way, an ethnic and/or religious people can
mobilize private education to negotiate a non-territorially bounded
political space that deliberately transcends state power and instills
new patterns of political consciousness.
Second, this work seeks to challenge two specific presuppositions
of contemporary legal scholarship on networks. It suggests that
scholars have failed to properly historicize networks; existing
literature tends to date the rise of networks to the end of the Cold
War, seeing their emergence as a consequence of the end of the
bipolar state system." I argue that these scholars neglect the fact that
forms of governance networks have been with us since at least the
end of the nineteenth century.12 Further, it claims that this ahistorical
approach has led network scholars to an overly simplistic analysis of
the relationships between networks and states, and to an excessively
narrow understanding of the capacity of networks to provide human
organization. Researchers of networks share the fundamental
assumption that network power comes solely at the expense of state
power. Whether they are celebrating the advent of authorized
government networks or fearing the destabilizing force of networks
of violent extremists, these scholars generally agree that the
increasing role of networks is an indicator of weaker state control.'
This historical study, however, demonstrates a more complex
interaction, in which the state and the network can both compete with
10. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Thomas Risse-Kappen, Preface to BRINGING
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS xi, xi

ACTORS,

DOMESTIC

TRANSNATIONAL
STRUCTURES AND

(Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995); AnneMarie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1044 (2003) (noting that
international lawyers were first introduced to "transnational" law in 1958). But see,
e.g., PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (articulating a view held by
a number of scholars, who locate the rise of transnationalism earlier than the end of
the Cold War).
12. This article tells the story of networks in the context of the modem nationstate system. This is not to suggest, however, that entities similar to the networks
discussed herein did not operate before the rise of the modem state.
13. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through
Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 177-78 (Michael

Byers ed., 2000) (writing about "the disaggregated State that comes in place of the
mythical unitary State").
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and support each other-and may emerge ultimately as
interdependent. Moreover, many contemporary scholars, despite
focusing on our "networked world order," do not consider the role
that networks can play as an alternative to the (territorial) state as the
embodiment of a people's national-political identity and its agent of
political action.14 Networks are typically envisioned as conduits for
the transborder movement of ideas, capital, goods, or people, and not
as tied to core questions of identity and the fundamental organization
of human community. Yet, this work suggests that at the beginning
of the twentieth century, likely continuing through today, the
network mode provided ethnic and/or religious communities a potent
transnational form of political power and satisfied national or seminational aspirations without the need for physical territory.
Third, and at odds with the view that only nation-states figure
centrally in the formulation of international law," this article
introduces the role played by the Alliance in the development of our
modern international legal and political institutions, particularly
those that protect human rights. It concentrates on the group's
lawmaking successes during the codification of the Minorities
Treaties at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). This contribution to
international lawmaking by a cross-border network forces us to
revise our understanding of the history of the discourse.1 6
Fourth, this work argues that modern international law played a
decisive role in sanctioning certain political forms while
marginalizing others. It identifies the Paris Peace Conference at the
14. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 283, 285 (2004) (contrasting her views to traditional
Westphalian notions of sovereignty).
15. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (applying only to an "international agreement concluded
between states"). Even today, an applicant for membership in the United Nations
must be a peace-loving state that accepts the obligations contained in the U.N.
Charter and represents a particular population and territory. U.N. Charter art. 4;
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097.
16. In general, human rights law is seen as emerging after World War II. See,
e.g., Makau Wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149, 149-179 (Michael Byers ed., 2000)

(discussing the development of human rights and its similarity to the Western
liberal democracy).
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conclusion of World War I, and in particular the dual scheme of selfdetermination (as legalized in the Peace Treaty) and minority rights
(the Minorities Treaties), as the critical point in suppressing the
network form and denying it legal meaning and political status. The
legal language employed in 1919 forms the foundation of our present
conceptual system, and leaves us today without the necessary tools
and vocabulary to understand transnational ethnic/religious networks
as political entities or to imagine how these groups might be
integrated into the formal legal system. International law worked to
mask what was essentially a political bargain at the time, one that
was designed to secure territorial stability and resolve the problem of
self-determination, and one that was engineered between historically
situated people: statesmen, international lawyers, and experts. The
state form existed long before 1919,17 but until then it was only one
out of many competing political structures for organizing collective
identity." It was, in part, through the lawmaking that followed the
end of World War I that states were anointed as the only legitimate
form of political organization and the only recognized legal entity.19
The state system was not a fait accompli, but instead emerged to
some extent as a result of the legal discourse of the time. This
historical analysis suggests that the common dictum that "states
make the law" is too simplistic. The converse is also true: the law
helped to make the modem state. This article attempts to recapture
the political, cultural, and social contexts of these developments, and
17. There are many different birth dates for the modern state-inter alia, 1648
and the Treaty of Westphalia, the eighteenth century with its innovations in
western political theories, and the American and French Revolutions.
18. Other forms of political organization include, for example, empires and
tribes. Indeed, even as late as 1918, in the aftermath of World War 1, the survival
of the Dual Monarchy was seen as a European "necessity." See Nathaniel Berman,
Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, in LAW AND MORAL
ACTION INWORLD POLITICS 108, 109-10 (Cecilia Lynch & Michael Loriaux eds.,

2000) (discussing cultural Modernism and the changes in international law
between World Wars I and II and concluding that changes in legal thought were
partly responsible for deep shifts in Western cultural history); see also JANE
BURBANK & FREDRICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE

POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 8-10 (2010) (defining the empire as a large political unit).

19. Scholars have written on other processes that also contributed to
normalizing territorial sovereignty. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-century International
Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 30-59 (1999) (writing on the role that colonialism
played in shaping and normalizing sovereignty).
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uncover their limits and consequences.
Fifth, I argue that the way in which the regime of minority rights
was institutionalized during the inter-war period left international
law without the capability to engage with ethnic and/or religious
entities outside the framework of the state, and avoided addressing
critical issues of minority-state conflict. This article explores a series
of decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) to
demonstrate how the court implemented the new regime for the
protection of minorities, with a particular focus on decisions dealing
with minority schools. The case law assumed an idealized static
coexistence between the minority and the majority as two culturally
separate entities that were unified within a single larger territorialpolitical frame. The existing decisions therefore provide us with no
guidelines for the resolution of conflicts between the minority and
the state. In the realm of education, the court guaranteed a minority
right to separate private schools but remained silent on the degree of
independence from state regulation that the schools should enjoy.
The Minorities era offers no precedents about limits on the right of
the minority to advocate in its schools an identity or political agenda
that diverges from state interests, or on the right of the state to dictate
regulations that force national assimilation.
In advancing these claims, this work builds on Professor Robert
20
Cover's interpretation of the law in "Nomos and Narrative."
Cover
argued that "no set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning." 2' This article
seeks to apply Cover's interpretation of the legal tradition to
international law, advancing the role of law not only in managing the
international order, but also in understanding it: the law provides
meaning and generates narratives that allow us to make sense of
certain political forms but not others. This work traces the ways in
which our international legal system developed in the inter-war
period, and claims that the law established a lexicon of political
action revolving around (territorial) statehood that denied meaning
and purpose to transnational networks. The result was to construe
states as the accepted form of political behavior while casting the
20. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
21. Id at 4.

20 11 ]
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network as politically deviant.
Part I of this article provides an in-depth analysis of the Alliance.
It describes how, working through their schools, the Alliance was
able to institute a new Jewish public political order that spanned
multiple lands across the Muslim world. It also explores the complex
relationships between this network and different states and protostates, concluding that the network/state relationship is unstable
across space and may be inherently unpredictable over time. Part II
analyzes the Minorities Treaties and the marginalization of network
entities in the aftermath of World War I. It also surveys a number of
legal decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
1920s and 1930s to evaluate how the new legal regime for the
protection of minorities was implemented, focusing in particular on
cases dealing with minority schools. Finally, Part III returns to the
Alliance to examine the decline of the network in the state-centered
regime that emerged after the war. It analyzes the specific national
laws that ultimately made the Alliance project impossible in one
exemplary location: the Ottoman Empire at the moment of its
transition to the Republic of Turkey. Part III also discuss the political
defeat of the Alliance within the Jewish community by the statist
movement for political Zionism. The article concludes with some
reflections on where this legal trajectory leaves us today in dealing
with ethnic/religious networks and minority religious educational
institutions, and on the capacity of international law to mediate
essentially political state/network disputes.

I. THE ALLIANCE
A. STRUCTURING AN ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS NETWORK IDENTITY
The Alliance was founded in Paris in 1860,22 and over the
following decades the group built and operated an extensive network
of Jewish schools across North Africa, the Middle East, the Ottoman
Empire, and the Balkans. 23 The first was founded in Morocco in
22. ARON RODRIGUE, IMAGES OF SEPHARDI AND EASTERN JEWRIES IN
TRANSITION: THE TEACHERS OF THE ALLIANCE ISRAtLITE UNIVERSELLE, 18601939 7 (1993).
23. See Paul Silberman, An Investigation of the Schools Operated by the
Alliance Isra6lite Universelle from 1862-1940 58-61 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (discussing the presence

1252

AM. U. INTL L.REV.

[26:5

1862; by 1914, there were hundreds of Alliance-run schools with
tens of thousands of students in what are today Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Turkey,
Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia
and Montenegro, and Bosnia.2 4 Between 1880 and 1914, the
Alliance's infrastructure came to constitute almost a surrogate Jewish
community: as one school director in Palestine put it, "[t]he school
became the community, and the community the school." 25
In most places, the Alliance schools were the only local
institutions providing Jewish mass education, having either replaced
the traditional schools or altered them beyond recognition.2 6 The
curriculum was borrowed from the French secular school system and
instruction was conducted in French, putting the Eastern Jewish
communities in direct touch with the Western world.2 7 In Muslim
lands, Alliance schools were the first to introduce secular education,
they were the only schools open to Jewish girls, and they were the
only schools providing evening classes for adults lacking any prior
education.28 The network covered the educational ground from
preschool classes through nursery, primary, and secondary school; it
sponsored and ran vocational schools and agricultural schools,
offered extensive apprentice training including workshops for
women, and operated religious schools (including rabbinical
seminaries).2 9 Its alumni societies were responsible for multiple
institutions ranging from hospitals to book clubs. 0
and development of Alliance schools in these regions).
24. See id. at 5 (listing the Alliance school located in Tetuan, Morocco); see
also RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 12 (stating that the Tetuan school was
established in 1862 and was immediately followed by schools in Damascus and
Baghdad).
25. See RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 13-14 (describing the expansion of
Alliance schools and programs).
26.

MICHAEL M. LASKIER, THE ALLIANCE ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE AND THE

JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF MOROCCO: 1862-1962 237 (1983) (noting that Alliance

schools were displacing old rabbinic schools since 1912).
27. See RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 25 (indicating that the core curriculum
included written and spoken French, at times in favor of Hebrew).
28. See id at 80-82 (highlighting the lack of formal education available for
women).
29. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 73-116, 139-68, 171-83 (detailing the
establishment of primary schools, agricultural programs, and seminaries).
30. See LASKIER, supra note 26, at 129-30, 256 n.115 (recognizing the
influence of alumni associations and noting some of the activities they undertook);
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In bad times, the Alliance teachers organized a communal
response to meet catastrophes. The schools distributed emergency
relief supplies such as food, medicine, and blankets, and provided
shelter when necessary." School directors provided medical services
in areas where there were few qualified physicians and even fewer
hospitals. They vaccinated Jewish populations against various
diseases prevalent in particular areas (such as smallpox in Tetuan and
typhus in Rabbat).3 2 The Alliance fed and clothed young Jews.3 3
During crises like the 1904 famine in Morocco, the food provided in
Alliance schools was often the only warm meal a Jewish youth
would eat all day.3 4
In peaceful times, the Alliance organized alumni societies, which
provided free health-care centers for the poor, hospitals, food
distribution, mutual loan societies, summer camps, evening classes to
teach European languages to the poor, and lectures designed to instill
Jewish solidarity and stimulate intellectual fervor.35 One Alliance
school director was even credited with creating the "first post office
line between Fez and Meknes, and one between Fez and Sefrou in
the 1890s."136
The effect of the Alliance's operations across the Islamic world
was dramatic. The combined impact of secular education, new
linguistic skills, training in a wide range of occupations, better health
care, and stronger communal organization led to the emergence of a
new Jewish middle class across the Muslim world. In the city of
Silberman, supra note 23, at 197 (describing similar social and cultural agencies
established by alumni associations).
31. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 185-86, 198.
32. See LASKIER, supra note 26, at 118 (highlighting the immunization
programs in response to the epidemics in Tetuan and Rabbat).
33. See id. at 117-18.
34. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 198; Michael Menachem Laskier, The
Jewish Communities of Morocco and the Alliance Israelite Universelle: 1860-1956
236-37 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los
Angeles) (stating that due to the humanitarian efforts of the Alliance, the Debdou
community did not succumb to starvation after a Berber attack that left many
residents hungry and without shelter).
35. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 197, 229 (describing certain alumni
activities and the encouragement that alumni received from the Alliance whose
main purpose was to succeed in creating food and clothing programs for the
communities' poor ); Laskier, supra note 34, at 289, 655-661.
36. Laskier, supra note 34, at 316.
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Salonika, for example, which was 56% Jewish in the late nineteenth
century,3 7 only a handful of Jewish residents had received modern
education prior to the opening of the first Alliance school in 1873.11
But by 1910, thousands of Jews had graduated from the Alliance
system, and nearly all of the Jewish clerks, merchants, artisans,
doctors, lawyers, engineers, and journalists in the city had attended
the network's primary schools. 9 In Baghdad, the new Jewish
influence on commerce was so great that on Saturday and Jewish
holidays, marketplaces were deserted and banks closed.40 In Syria,
the local politicians reminded the Jews that the Alliance was
responsible for their escape from insignificance.4 1 One Iranian Jewish
leader perhaps best summed up the impact of the Alliance's
transnational network on Jews all across the Muslim world: "Once,"
he declared, "God sent Moses to redeem the Jews. Now the Alliance
Israelite Universelle has come to save us." 42
The Alliance consciously organized the Jewish population into a
network that cut across territorial boundaries: "a link," declared its
Manifesto, must be "created, a solidarity established, from country to
37. George Weill, Agudat Kol Israel haverim v Matzvan h-hvrati shel khilot
hyam-htichon b-sof h-meha h-yod-tet (1860-1914) [The Alliance Isra6lite
Universelle and the State of the Jewish Communities of the Mediterraneanat the
End of the Nineteenth Century], in L"'ALLIANCE" DANS LES COMMUNAUTES DU
BASSIN MEDITERRANEEN A LA FIN DU 19EME SIECLE ET SON INFLUENCE SUR LA
SITUATION SOCIALE ET CULTURELLE [THE "ALLIANCE" COMMUNITIES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY AND THEIR SOCIAL AND

CULTURAL INFLUENCE] 9 (Simon Schwarzfuchs ed., 1987) [hereinafter THE
"ALLIANCE" COMMUNITIES INTHE MEDITERRANEAN].

38. Silberman, supra note 23, at 218 (noting that thirty-five years later, there
were thousands of Jewish residents in the community that had received education).
39. Id.; see also Paul Dumont, Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last
Decades of the Nineteenth-Century in Light of the Archives of the Alliance Isradite
Universelle, in CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1, 209-42

(Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982) (providing extensive statistical
data on the transformation of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire after the coming of
the Alliance).
40. Tzvi Zohar, H Alliance bkhilot agan hayam ha-tichon b-sof h-meha h-yodtet [Alliance in the Jewish Communities of the Mediterraneanat the end of the 19 th
Century], in THE "ALLIANCE" COMMUNITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, supra note
37, at 1, 1-35 (citing BULLETIN SEMESTRIEL DE L'ALLIANCE ISRAELITE

UNIVERSELLE 109 (1913) [hereinafter BAIU]).
41. Silberman, supra note 23, at 212.
42. Avraham Cohen, Iranian Jewry and the Educational Endeavors of the
Alliance IsraMite Universelle, 48 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 15, 31-32 (1986).
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country, embracing in its network all that is Jewish."43 As the
Alliance Manifesto put it, this Jewish network corresponded to
"neither a state, nor a society, nor a determinate territory."" Narcisse
Leven, one of the prominent personalities who presided over the
creation of the Alliance and the elaboration of its ideological
platform, emphasized transnationalism as an organizing principle of
the Jewish network: "A work like that of the Alliance cannot and
should not be shut in the borders of one country."45 S. Bloch, the
editor of the Alliance Israelite, expressed the network's complete
rejection of Jewish territorial identity:
There is no such thing as geographical Judaism, that is, [a form of
Judaism] confined to, and circumscribed by, certain countries, and
influenced by certain local mores; but there is a cosmopolitan, universal,
invariable, and independent entity called Judaism, above time, space, soil
and races. 46

The founders of the Alliance consciously structured their
transnational Jewish network as a political entity, or in the words of
its founders, a "political force preoccupied with Jewish interests."4 7
The content that the Alliance gave its network mirrored a territorial
government. The Manifesto explained: "[A]ll other important faiths
are represented in the world by nations-embodied, that is to say, in
governments ... ."48 Because of their transnational existence, the
Jewish people alone are left stripped of "th[e] important advantage"
of having a government that has "a special interest and an official
duty to represent and speak for them."4 9 The Alliance appointed itself

43. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE JEWS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY FRANCE: FROM THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE ALLIANCE ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE 252-253, 253 n.9
(1996).
44. Id. at 254, 254 n. 14 (quoting the "Manifeste de juillet 1860").
45. GEORGES WEILL, EMANCIPATION ET PROGRES: L'ALLIANCE

ISRAELITE
UNIVERSELLE ET LES DROITS DE L'HOMME [EMPOWERMENT AND PROGRESS: THE
ALLIANCE ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 64 (2000) (quoting

Narcisse Leven).
46. Michel Abitbol, The Encounter Between French Jewry and the Jews of
North Africa: Analysis of a Discourse (1830-1914), in THE JEWS IN MODERN
FRANCE 31, 36 (Frances Malino & Bernard Wassertein eds., 1985).
47. GRAETZ, supra note 43, at 277, 277 n.80.
48. DAVID VITAL, A PEOPLE APART: THE JEWS IN EUROPE, 1789-1939 485-86
(2001) (quoting the "Manifeste de juillet 1860").
49. Id. at 485.
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the "political force" to fill in the vacuum of "Jewish statelessness"
and to perform the "official duty" of governing and caring for "all
that is Israelite."50
This network format does not fit neatly into the familiar structures
employed by contemporary scholars of international law and
international relations. Existing literature generally divides networks
into two main categories or types. The first type is made up of
networks that operate in the private sphere, mainly the market and
civil society, to address common problems across borders." These
networks are usually based in a normative idea or collectively-shared
special interest. Lacking explicit ties to state power, these groups do
not have formal political capabilities of the kind recognized by
international law. The second type is transgovernmental networks, by
which state officials may exchange information and coordinate
activity to combat global crime or address common problems on a
global scale.52
The Alliance defies categorization within this taxonomy. Rather, it
adds a new type: the network as a vehicle for the political
organization of ethnic-religious identity. Structurally, the Alliance,
like a private network, was a voluntary, non-territorial agency
operating across borders and linking many actors engaged in a
common project. The group relied on the mechanisms of soft power
(specifically, education) for ordering the members of its ethnic50. Silberman, supra note 23 at 51.
51. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8, 17-18 (1998) (defining

private networks as "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal,
and horizontal patterns of communication and.exchange," and providing examples
of advocacy networks); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal ContractualRelations in the DiamondIndustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115,
129 (1992) (writing about private commercial networks); Peter M. Hass,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46
INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (providing other examples of private networks on
"epistemic communities").
52. "Government networks" have been studied extensively by Anne-Marie
Slaughter, who defines them as "networks of national government officials
exchanging information, coordinating national policies and working together to
address common problems." Slaughter, supra note 11, at 1041 (providing
examples of: state officials operating across borders to address economic issues,
security, and environmental concerns; judges exchanging decisions with one
another; and legislators reaching across borders to standardize their laws and
regulations).
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religious community. But the Alliance also differed from
contemporary private networks, which typically focus on a
"specialized issue area" or cause. 53 The Alliance was concerned with
the interests and public order of Jews worldwide, an entire ethnicreligious people. In so doing, it sought a wider power than that
available in the private realm of contracts and property.
In its attempt to achieve political capabilities and institute Jewish
public order, the Alliance resembled today's transgovernmental
networks, which arrogate to themselves certain functions taken from
the state. But there is a marked difference here, too. Government
networks work for their governments or other domestic political
institutions, as a tool for coordinating action between and among
states. They can therefore only emerge in the context of states and
are ultimately intertwined with territorial power. 54 The Alliance, by
contrast, completely rejected the concept of a Jewish territorial state.
Instead, it developed a distinct political structure of its own that
operated outside any government's official legal framework."
Nor can the Alliance be neatly described in terms of the modem
concept of the public/private divide,5 6 which splits the sphere of the
public state from that of the market and private civil society. 7 The
53. KECK& SIKKINK, supra note 51, at 8.
54. Indeed the "genius" of government networks is "that they marry soft with
hard power." ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER 168 (2004).
55. See RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 11-12 (noting that the Alliance established
a formal relationship with the French government only after World War I and
lacked a legal French status until 1975).
56. The public/private distinction has several connotations; here it is used
within the liberal political tradition, the distinction between the state and civil
society. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 1 (A. Castell ed., 1947) (defending
individual liberty and articulating corresponding limits on government
interference). See generally KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION, reprintedin
WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216 (L. Easton &
K. Guddat eds., 1967) (discussing the political emancipation of Jewish people in
Germany's Christian state); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982) (discussing the emergence of
the public realm in various legal doctrines).
57. See MARX, supra note 56, at 216 (using "civil society" in the Marxian
sense of a "private" civil society that is not the political state, as opposed to
Hegel's use of "civil society" as an abstract universal that can mature into a state
through education of civil life); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study ofldeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498 n.16
(1983) (discussing the relationship between civil society and the political state).

1258

AM. U.INTLL.REV.

[26:5

Alliance was a private entity in that its institutional core was a
system of private Jewish schools that operated outside state
regulation and state finance. Enrollment at the schools was voluntary
and not contingent on top-down law. In principle, a tuition fee was
collected from the students. At the same time, however, the Alliance
schools were also public in the sense that they were open to all on
equal terms (both Jews and non-Jews), and that they took in all the
students in the Jewish communities who sought admission, including
those who could not afford the minimal tuition fee." Moreover, the
schools were deliberately organized to provide much more than basic
education. The Alliance used its educational network to define a
political identity and instill a public order for the Jewish community
spanning multiple lands. The explicit mission of the schools was
civic-the Alliance taught Jewish youth to become active, engaged
citizens, a classic function of state-run public schools.59 Indeed the
U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the role of public schools
carry an overriding importance in sustaining the state's political and
cultural heritage.6 0

58. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 77 (noting that poorer students were
granted free admission to Alliance schools).
59. See JOHN DEWEY, THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM AND "THE SCHOOL
AND SOCIETY" 6-29 (1957) (advocating for the socialization of children in
schools); KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 293 ("It is widely accepted that a basic task
of schooling is to prepare each new generation for their responsibilities as citizens.
Indeed, the need to create a knowledgeable and responsible citizenry was one of
the major reasons for establishing a public school system, and for making
education mandatory."); MACEDO, supra note 9, at 85 (noting that public schools
were thought to be an institution critical for the establishment of political order);
John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 316-318 (2001) (discussing the secularization of
American schools as justified for the sake of national unity); James E. Ryan,
CharterSchools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 393, 405-06 (2008)
(pointing out that, historically, the civic and socializing missions of public schools
were as important as the academic mission). See generally DEWEY, supra note 9
(providing some of the most influential theory about education and the role of
schools in guiding experiences of children and fostering in them the capacity to
contribute to society).
60. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting that education is
one of the most important functions of the state and is also an important
component of a democratic society).
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B. THE COMPLEX IDEOLOGY OF THE ETHNIC-RELIGIOUS
NETWORK

The Alliance explicitly involved its schools in creating a new and
lasting way of being Jewish. The group declared "we want to form
men: that, in a few words, is what our program is all about."6 ' The
"new Jew" molded by the Alliance had dual loyalties. First, the
Alliance used its schooling system to instill in the Jews of the
Muslim world ties of "solidarity," and to generate genuine,
meaningful political participation and cultural links among all Jews.62
Solidarity among all Jews worldwide was a central goal of the
Alliance. 63 This is reflected in the motto of the Alliance: "all
Israelites are responsible to each another."" The vocabulary of
obligation among world Jews transcended any geographically based
identity and included two specific legal and political requirements: to
defend individual oppressed Jews and to protect against general
attacks on Judaism.6 5
Second, the Alliance used its schools to train the Jews in the mores
and obligations of citizenship in a nation-state structure, and to
cultivate the values and knowledge necessary for participation in the
larger political process. The founders of the Alliance sought to
duplicate through their schools the path to citizenship that they
themselves had traveled in France.66 The French State had
61. ARON RODRIGUE, FRENCH JEWS, TURKISH JEWS: THE ALLIANCE ISRAELITE
UNIVERSELLE AND THE POLITICS OF JEWISH SCHOOLING INTURKEY, 1860-1925 169,
169 n.4 (1990) (quoting Jacques Bigart, the Alliance's powerful Secretary-General
from 1892 until his death in 1934).
62. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 65-67 (discussing the Alliance's belief
that the education of girls was especially important to maintain Jewish solidarity in
Muslim countries because education was one of the only means for girls to combat
the social inferiority of women in Muslim countries, and because education would
ultimately make women more effective in providing spiritual and intellectual
guidance for their children).
63. Id. at 50 (noting that the "Universelle" portion of the Alliance's title came
about due to the yearning for worldwide solidarity among Jews).
64. See id at 83. The Alliance's Appeal also declared that all Jews are "are
brothers."
65. See id. at 51 (listing one of the Alliance's original aims as "to lead effective
aid to those who are made to suffer because of their Judaism").
66. One of the founders and Presidents of the Alliance reflected this sensibility:
Everyone can appreciate the benefits resulting from the emancipation of the Jews of
France. Once they formed a foreign population . . . now they are devoted citizens,
loving and serving their country . . .. This state of the Jews, exceptional and proper to
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emancipated its Jews following the Revolution and granted them
citizenship. 67 Furthermore, France put in place a public school
system to prepare young people (including Jews) for their
responsibilities as citizens and to instill loyalty to the French
Republic.6 1 The Alliance schools, taking their cue from the French
model, trained world Jewry in the responsibilities of citizenship and
inculcated loyalty to state power. The Alliance was less concerned
with "producing half-learned men than in forming good and tolerant
men who feel an attachment to their duties as citizens and as Jews,
who are dedicated to the public good and to their brothers ....
These two explicit objectives of the Alliance educational network
describe two symbolic systems for Jewish political existence that
were in a dialectical tension with each other. The first conceptual
system is that of public political Jewish solidarity. This system
imagined Jewish liberation as the flourishing of a sovereign Jewish
entity cutting across territorial boundaries. It depicted the Jewish
community as a single political and cultural entity based on the logic
of absolute identity. A unifying presumption situates the Jews in an
active obligatory relation to one another and belonging to an
autonomous public self that exists outside the formation of the
territorial state.
The second conceptual system, that of state citizenship, was based
on the principles of the 1789 French Revolution. 70 It maps Jewish
liberation as equality; this equality is structured in terms of a
relationship, or a legal bond, between citizens, as individual right
holders, and the state that implements these rights . 7 Defining Jews
[those of] Franceonly, will become their normal state amongst all the people.

RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 24 (quoting Jules Carvallo, one of the founders of the
Alliance and its President, from two appeals published in Archives Isra6lite in
1851 and 1853 for the creation of an international Jewish congress).
67. See, e.g., Pierre Birnbaum & Ira Katznelson, Emancipationand the Liberal
Offer, in PATHS OF EMANCIPATION: JEWS, STATES, AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 4 (Pierre

Birnbaum & Ira Katznelson eds., 1995)
emancipation of the Jews in France).

(providing an overview on the

68. See generally EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE
MODERNIZATION OF RURAL FRANCE 1870-1914 303-339 (1976) (discussing

France's efforts to use education to turn the masses into Frenchmen).
69. RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 73.
70. See generally RODRIGUE, supranote 22, at 8.

71. See id. (laying out the path to emancipation, which included abandoning
certain habits and striving to become enlightened citizens worthy of emancipation).
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by citizenship, not by their religious or ethnic group, configures the
problems facing world Jews in modem political terms, imagines the
solutions in legal terms, and consolidates the experience of the
individual Jew into the exercise of legal entitlements. The relevant
participants are the state and the individual Jew as an abstract citizen
in the public realm, who may be Jewish only in the private realm.
The vocabulary of this system is that of equal rights and participation
within the state, not that of obligations spanning national boundaries.
This system downgrades religion, the locus of transnational public
political Jewish solidarity, to the private commitments of free men in
civil society, while placing the territorial state at the center of the
emancipatory process. Jewish solidarity disappears from view in the
public realm.
The Alliance always held strong to both sides of its Jewish
political identity, despite the inherent tensions in embracing both a
particular Jewish political agenda and a liberal universalist outlook.72
Narcisse Leven, one of the founders of the Alliance, explained: "We
would like to proclaim that [our works] do not serve civilization any
less than Judaism."7 "We are bound," proclaimed the Alliance,
[t]o protect the hereditary characteristics of our past, as an integral part of
human patrimony that our forbearers delegated to us and that we have to
transmit: to give to nations of citizens, tightly united, but conscious of
their origin, instructed in the obligations of solidarity that universal
opinion imposes, resolved to accept those obligations in a spirit of
fraternity. 74

The Alliance was able to sustain its two seemingly oppositional
discourses of Jewish identity because the network operated in many
geographical settings simultaneously. In each territory, the Alliance
educational system prioritized one form of being Jewish and
submerged the other.75 To demonstrate this point, below is an
72. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 56, at 216.
73. WEILL, supra note 45, at 61.
74. Id. at 97.
75. In arguing that the Alliance achieved flexibility by building its ideology
around a dialectical tension between two systems for being Jewish, this work
benefits from Janet Halley's definition of "binary identities." Halley explains the
nature of binary identities:
[A] double bind involves a systematic arrangement of symbolic systems with at least
three characteristics. First, two conceptual systems (or "discourses") are matched in
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examination of Alliance operations across four different territories:
Morocco, the Ottoman Empire, Algeria, and France.
The Alliance opened its first school in Morocco in 1862.76 When
the network first arrived in Morocco, official power was still in the
hands of the Sultan although the Kingdom was increasingly
influenced by Western powers fighting for a foothold." The Jewish
network expected the French presence in Morocco to be long-lasting,
and publicly and politically linked the fate of native Jews to France.
The Alliance explicitly designated its schools to "serve France" and
to form out of the Jewish youth "dedicated citizens for her future,
citizens who would help maintain French ascendancy in this
country."78 The schools oriented the Jews to France as their
"intellectual homeland" and "their adopted homeland."79 At the same
time, the Alliance education deliberately distanced the Jewish
community from the civil and political institutions of the surrounding
Muslim majority. The Alliance school director in Morocco explained
that in the Kingdom, where the spirit of revolt and independence is
strong, France should be able "to look for support to the educated
and completely liberated Jewish population.""
The Ottoman Empire was another principal area of Alliance
operations." In the Empire, the Alliance operated under the millet
their opposition to one another . . . . Second, the preferred discourse actually requires
the submerged one to make it work . . . third, that very instability can be the source of

suppleness and resilience, because the two stacked discourses can be flipped: the one
that was submerged and denied can become express, and it in turn can be covertly
supported by the one that was preferred.
Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1748-49 (1993).
76. See Silberman, supra note 23, at 252 (describing the founding of the Tetuan
school).
77. Daniel J. Schroeter & Joseph Chetrit, Emancipation and Its Discontents:
Jews at the FormativePeriodof Colonial Rule in Morocco, 13 JEWISH Soc. STUD.
170, 175 (2006) (exploring the tension between the Alliance mission and the
sultan's desire to maintain the traditional Islamic system and the dhimmi status of
the Jews).
78. RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 220-22 (citing Letter from Y. D. S6mach to
the Central Committee in Paris, Rabat, (31 January, 1931), Archives of the AIU,
Maroc I. C. 1-2).
7 9. Id.
80. Id. at 218-19 (citing Letter from Y. D. Semach to the Central Committee in
Paris, Tangier, (August 7, 1923) (Archives of the AIU, France XV. F. 26).
81. Aron Rodrigue, From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jews, in PATHS OF
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framework of organization, where the Muslim rulers remained
outside the cultural realm of non-Muslims and so did not interfere in
the education of Jews and Christians.8 2 Here, as in Morocco, the
Alliance sought to prepare Jews for their roles as individual citizens.
But, unlike in Morocco, in the Ottoman Empire the Alliance felt the
existing territorial ruler offered the best hope for a liberal or quasiliberal order." As a result, the Alliance schools did not teach loyalty
to France but instead sought to prepare Jews to be Ottoman citizens
and fostered genuine "devotion and affection for Turkey."84 In order
to mold Jews as "patriotic citizens" committed to the "great endeavor
to make the empire glorious again,"" the Alliance taught the Turkish
language in its schools8 6 and aided the assimilation of the Jews into
the external Muslim society. The schools also encouraged students to
join the Turkish army as part of their duty as citizens."
While in Morocco and the Ottoman Empire, the Alliance
subordinated religious particularity to citizenship and participation in
the external political order, in Algeria the network did the opposite.
The Alliance arrived in Algeria relatively late. Algeria was a French
colonial territory considered a province of the mother country-"as
much a part of France as the Ddpartementde la Seine,"" and starting
in 1870 Algerian Jews were made French citizens.8 9 Because the
Jews had already obtained French citizenship, the Alliance did not
supra note 67, at 248, 250
(noting that by 1914, each Turkish community had an Alliance school).
82. See Kemal H. Karpat, Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity
of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era, in CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 142 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982) (providing
more detail on the millet system).
83. Dan A. Porat, The Nation Revised: Teaching the Jewish Pastin the Zionist
Present (1890-1913), 13 JEWISH Soc. STUD. 59, 63-64 (2006) (noting the strategy
of emancipation and social integration used in the Ottoman Empire and contrasting
this strategy against the insular Jewish communities of the Middle East and North
Africa).
84. RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 125.
85. RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 279.
86. Aron Rodrigue, Jewish Society and Schooling in a Thracian Town: The
Alliance Isradlite Universelle in Demotica, 1897-1924, 45 JEWISH Soc. STUD. 263,
279 (1983).
87. RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 141.
88. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 131 (1994).
89. Schroeter & Chetrit, supra note 77, at 175 (mentioning the naturalization of
Algerian Jews as French citizens through issue of the Crimieux Decree of 1870).
EMANCIPATION: JEWS, STATES, AND CITIZENSHIP,
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think that Algeria should be part of its sphere of activity: "Was not
that country a French territory; had not our fellow Jews been, in
1870, granted the honorable status of citizens of the Republic?" 90 The
director of the Alliance explained that the work of the Alliance in
Algeria "owes its origins to the emotions aroused among world
Jewry by the anti-Semitic outbreaks of 1898."91 These atrocious
pogroms were organized by immigrants from France determined to
"water the tree of our liberty with Jewish blood." 92 In reaction to the
violence of French newcomers and the inaction of the French
government when native Jews were "hunted down and beaten like
animals," 3 and in response to the simultaneous election of Edouard
Drumont, the foremost Jew-baiter in France, as the deputy elected to
parliament from Algeria, the Alliance decided to establish its first
schools in Algeria. These schools did not provide a secular French
curriculum but instead emphasized Jewish solidarity, encouraging
the students to "cling" to their "eternal and immutable past and
heritage."94 Providing a narrower, more concrete definition of Jewish
political identity entailed a partial Jewish withdrawal from secular
French patterns. The Alliance opened a network of private afternoon
Jewish religious schools, called Talmudei Torah (the traditional
name for Jewish religious schools) and the education imparted there
inculcated specific Jewish cultural practices, ideas, structures, and
rituals. The curriculum included "reading and writing in Hebrew,
translation of prayers and the Bible, fundamentals of grammar,
Biblical and post-Biblical Jewish history, and a study of the ethical
practices, religious duties, and holidays of the Jews." 95
The Alliance did not have any schools within France itself. There,
as in Algeria, the Jews already enjoyed equal political rights as
citizens. The network left the state to train Jewish youth in the mores
and obligations of citizenship. Within France, its birthplace and
90. RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 107-110 (quoting M. Nahom, Annual Report,
Archives of the AIU, France VII.F.13).
91. Id. at 107-110.
92. MICHEL ABITBOL, M CRIMIEUX L PlITAIN - ANTI-SEMITISM B ALGERIA HCOLONIALIT 1840-1870 [ANTI-SEMITISM IN COLONIAL ALGERIA] 41 (1993).

93. RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 107-110.

94. Id. at 107-110.
95. Joan Gardner Roland, The Alliance Isradlite Universelle and French Policy
in North Africa, 1860-1918 253 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University) (on file with author).
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headquarters, the Alliance divested itself of any political content and
the organization instead resembled a private voluntary association
"like the Solidarit Republicaine and Masonic Lodges," whose
operations focused on soliciting membership, collecting dues and
raising funds. 96
The Alliance sustained its seemingly contradictory system of
political identity by using its educational network to emphasize in
each territory of its operations across the Islamic world only one
system of its complex pattern of Jewish identity. The Alliance
decided which system to prioritize and which to ignore based on both
the nature of French power and interests and the characteristics of the
governing structures in each territory across its wide sphere of
operations. Thus, although the Alliance purposely opted for the
transnational form of organizing Jewish identity and deliberately
rejected territorial structures, the Jewish network always maintained
an ambivalent relationship to territoriality. Since the Alliance
privileged only one side of its complex identity in each territory, the
group achieved coherence only in the transnational realm. To sustain
its Jewish transnational political organization, the Alliance always
had to operate simultaneously across multiple territorial boundaries.
C. THE STATE AND THE NETWORK: UNPREDICTABLE
RELATIONSHIPS

Both the French state and the Zionist national movement (a protostate) had complex interactions with the transnational form of the
Alliance. First, supportive: These state projects used the network,
among other entities, as a tool to build and disseminate their
particular national identity. 97 Second, competitive: In promoting an
opportunity for independent identity formation, the network stood in
direct competition and conflict with the territorial identities fostered

96. LISA MOSES LEFF, SACRED BONDS OF SOLIDARITY - THE RISE OF JEWISH
INTERNATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 179 (2006).

97. Compare JAMES COOKE, NEW FRENCH IMPERIALISM, 1880-1910: THE
THIRD REPUBLIC AND THE COLONIAL EXPANSION 19-20 (1937) (explaining how

France saw imperialism, particularly with the Alliance, as a way of spreading their
culture and ideas), with Rallying the Forces of Opposition (Sept. 1903), in IB THE
LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN 35, 38 (Barnet Litvinof ed., 1983)

(highlighting how the Zionist movement intended on collaborating with the
Alliance to further the "purity of the Zionist idea").
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by France and by the Zionists. 98 The interplay between these three
institutions reveals a rich dynamic in which they supported and
challenged each other at the same time,99 demonstrating that the
relationship between the transnational and the territorial is
remarkably fluid and results in outcomes that are unpredictable over
time.
1. The Alliance and France
French national identity, as embodied in the principles of the
Revolution, included not only a particular loyalty to the ethnic,
territorial, and cultural background of France, but also a conviction
that French values represented the common morals of all mankind. 0
France sought continuously to spread its own culture, tongue, and
ideas outside the confines of its own territorial boundaries. To do
this, France built upon various transnational networks, one of which
was the Alliance.
The Alliance spread and circulated French values, language, and
way of life among the Jews-an important segment of native
populations across the Islamic East.
Morocco provides an example of the ways in which the Alliance
helped France to spread the centrality of its culture and orient
populations toward France. France, already in control of Algeria, had
a "special interest" in the Moroccan Kingdom as the geographical
and economic prolongation of Oran, a city located in Northwestern
Algeria. But Morocco lacked indigenous Christian communities, the

98. Compare LASKIER, supra note 26, at 156 (noting the Alliance's "anger and
dismay" at the opening of French schools in Morocco), with 2 THEODOR HERZL,
ZIONIST WRITINGS: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 110 (Harry Zohn trans., 1973)

(conveying the Zionist sentiment that no group did more harm compared to the
good that it could have done than the "pompous" Alliance).
99. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNiEMI,

FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE

STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 476 (Cambridge Univ. Press

2005) (1989) (discussing the tension between self-determination and community of
states in the context of international law); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205, 211-21, 382 (1979)
(highlighting the unresolved tension between community and individualism in
liberal political theory).
100. See COOKE, supra note 97, at 20 (1937) (quoting the French politician Jean
Jaures, who said, "France's mission was to spread the Gospel of French culture,
liberalism, and egalitarianism: the principles of 1789").
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traditional ally of French powers in their forced opening of Eastern
territories, and French missionaries proved unsuccessful in
0 The Alliance provided France with
converting the Muslim masses.o'
an opening into Morocco at a moment of intense colonial
competition with other European powers.
In 1902, before France established its colonial rule over Morocco,
the French Minster Plenipotentiary in Tangier, G. Saint Ren6
Taillandier, wrote of the Alliance's value to France. Taillandier
noted that the graduates of the Alliance constituted the only segment
of the indigenous population in Morocco that spoke French, and they
acted as the chief intermediary between Morocco and Europe.
Taillandier reasoned that France "[m]ust continue to regard with
utmost sympathy the activities of the Alliance, hoping that its
schools advance French culture among the Jews."' 0 2 If successful in
this endeavor, Taillandier predicted that the Jewish network might
bring "a stunning victory" to France and help France in diminishing
the influence of Spain and England over Morocco.0 3 A few years
later, after the signing of the Treaty of Fez (1912) giving sovereignty
over the North and the Reif Mountains in Morocco to France,
Eugene Regnault, the French Minister in Morocco, praised the
leading role of the Alliance in helping France to establish its colonial
rule by spreading the "radiance of French language and culture
among the indigenous people of Morocco."
At the same time that the Alliance played an important role in
supporting the success of the French national project, the group also
directly competed with French power. The Alliance was founded in
the first place as an act of defiance by French Jews against their state.
The organization was born in reaction to the Damascus Affair
(1840), when the Jewish community of Syria was blamed for the
disappearance of a monk and his servant in the busy streets of
Damascus.1 5 More than anyone else, the French Consul in
101. See Laskier, supra note 34, at 121 (stating that at the time, the Jews, several
of whom were Alliance graduates, were the only indigenous French speaking
population in Morocco and were key to the French becoming involved in
commercial circles within Morocco).
102. Id. at 121.
103. Id. at 121-22.
104. Id. at 123.
105. See S. POSENER, ADOLPHE CREMIEUx: A BIOGRAPHY 89 (Eugene Golob
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Damascus, an agent of the Republic, was responsible for pushing
forward the affair.10 6 The Consul was backed by the French Foreign
Minister, Louis Adolphe Thiers, who gathered, as he publicly
explained, the "courage" to "protect his representative" against the
Jewish "attack."o' In support of his Consul, Thiers announced during
a parliamentary debate that there was a gap between the interests of
France and its Jews.' Abandoned by the state, French Jews united
with Jews outside France to resist the allegations. They met in
England-then on the brink of war with France-to establish an
organized Jewish collective political force to address the Damascus
Affair.' 09 In London, Adolphe Cr6mieux, the soon-to-become
President of the Alliance, summed up the rationale for the
establishment of the new Jewish network: "France is against us." 0
Inside -France, moreover, the Alliance created room for French
Jews to identify, politically and publicly, with an entity other than
the French state: a broader non-territorial Jewish sovereign. Outside
France, too, the Alliance eventually confronted French power in each
colony, either directly or indirectly through its students. North Africa
provides an example. In Algeria, as discussed earlier, the Alliance
religious schools were deliberately designed to generate in the youth
of the community an affiliation with a Jewish transnational
sovereignty and distance from France as their primary locus of
allegiance. In Morocco, friction emerged when France opened its
own state-run Franco-Isradlite schools, intending to replace the

trans., 1940) ("[It was] insinuated that Father Thomas had been murdered by the
Jews for ritual purposes.").
106. See JONATHAN FRANKEL, THE DAMASCUS AFFAIR: RITUAL MURDER,
POLITICS, AND THE JEWS IN 1840 21-30 (1997) (discussing in detail the Damascus
Affair, including the French Consul's investigation of the affair, and their
suspicion of several Jewish men in connection with the disappearance).
107. POSENER, supra note 105, at 105.
108. Louis Adolphe Thiers: "You make an appeal on behalf of Jews; well, then,
I make an appeal on behalf of a Frenchmen . .

.

. It requires courage for a minister

to protect his representative under such attack." See id at 104-06 ("Thus the [postDamascus Affair] situation became clear. One could no longer count on the
intervention of the French.. . . Thiers was engaged in an adventurous policy in the
Near East . .. and did not wish to disavow his representative at Damascus.").
109. See id. at 106 (explaining a public meeting between Sir Moses Montefiore,
Cr6mieux, and the English Viceroy, in which a resolution between the French Jews
and the English was approved).
110. Id. at 106.
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Alliance schools."' The Alliance refused to close its schools and,
ultimately, France ceded control of the Franco-Isra6lite schools to the
Alliance, committing itself to providing financial subsidies for the
entire Alliance educational network in the Mediterranean Basin. 12
In Tunisia, the students of the Alliance in their individual
capacities began to oppose French colonial rule. One example is
Albert Memmi, born to a very poor Jewish family in the ghetto of
Tunisia and educated in the Alliance school system. Memmi went on
to graduate from the Sorbonne and become a prominent French
writer and an eminent Professor of Sociology. His writings, in
particular his 1957 work The Colonizer and the Colonized, served as
the voice of the Tunisian national movement. "The colonial
condition," he wrote, "cannot be adjusted to; like an iron collar, it
can only be broken."ll 3
2. The Alliance and Zionism
Both the Alliance and the Zionists set out to create the new
"Jewish man." The new Jew as conceived by the Alliance comported
with two simultaneous systems of identity: a citizen of his state of
residence and a part of a transnational Jewish sovereignty. The
Zionists reconfigured these loyalties and rooted them in territory: the
"new Jew" was to be a citizen of a future Jewish homeland, building
up "a Jewish nation from within" Palestine.1 14
The Zionist split with the Alliance was explicit. Chaim Weizmann,
the leader of the Zionist delegation to the Peace Conference at
Versailles, the president of the World Zionist Organization in 1920,
and the first President of the State of Israel, expressed a complete
and continual "opposition""' to the Alliance. The Zionists defined
their national-territorial identity in significant part by rejecting the

111. See LASKIER, supra note 26, at 156 (conveying the Alliance's strong
negative reaction to the newly created French schools).
112. See Laskier, supra note 34, at 352 (discussing the belief of some French
officials that the Alliance had become outdated and the tuition-free Franco-Israelite
schools were a suitable replacement with a sound educational curriculum).
113. ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 128 (1965).
114. MARGARET MACMILLIAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 412 (2001).
115. Letter no. 128 from Chaim Weizmann to Moses Gaster, in VII THE
LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN 162-165 (Barnet Litvinoff ed., 1978).
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transnational
strategy
propounded
by
the
Alliance
("internationalization," in the words of Weizmann).116 While the
Alliance argued that the Jews "have not been a nation for two
thousand years,"' 7 for the Zionists the Jews were "an organization
which is nationalist in its fundamental views" and cannot "give up an
iota of our national program.""' Against the Alliance position that
"there is no such thing as geographical Judaism,"' 19 Weizmann
emphasized that Jewish Nationalism means the "return of the Jews to
Palestine and setting up there a Jewish life 100%." 120
The Zionists attacked the Alliance from both sides of its complex
identity. Theodore Herzl explained that the Alliance was "neither
universal, nor an alliance nor-least of all-Jewish."'2 1 Herzl argued
that the Alliance was not really supporting universal values, but
rather its existence suggested a secret "international association of
Jews" that was "plotting to establish a Jewish world dominion" and
which "constitute . . . [a] 'state within a state' which is justly
taboo." 22 The "sooner this 'Alliance' disappeared from the face of
the earth," Herzl held, "the better ... ."123
In practical terms, the Zionists stood in direct opposition to the
Alliance plan of Jewish integration into external society both in
Eastern Europe and in Palestine. In Eastern and Central Europe, the
Alliance held that anything short of making the Jews into citizens
with equal civil and political rights meant establishing "the ghetto
system reversed."1 24 The Zionists, in contrast, demanded complete
Jewish legal and political institutional separation. The Zionists'
objective was to federate all Jewish communities as a Jewish nation
and to admit the Jews "as a people of fifteen million," into the
116. Letter no. 359 from Chaim Weizmann to Tschlenow (telegram), in IB THE
supra note 97, at 383.
Professor Sylvain Lvi, the President
of the Alliance in 1919).
118. Letter no. 411 from Chaim Weizmann to Harry Lewis, in IB THE LETTERS
AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 97, at 423.
119. Abitbol, supra note 46 (emphasis added).
120. Letter no. 204 from Chaim Weizmann to Felix Frankfurte, in IX THE
LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN,
117. WEILL, supra note 37, at 205 (citing

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN 204-5 (Bamet Litvinoff ed., 1978).

121. HERZL,supra note 98, at 110.
122. LASKIER, supra note 26, at 195.

123. HERZL, supra note 98, at 111.
124. August Gauvain, Le Sionisme, JOURNAL

DES DEBATS,

March 2, 1919, at 1.
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League of Nations as a separate nation, as an interim step toward a
Jewish state in Palestine. 25 Such claims for the legal and political
separation of the Jews from the majority populations around them in
Europe meant for the Alliance destroying "everything for which
French Jewry had worked since the French Revolution."' 26
In its operations in Palestine, the Alliance called for caring for the
existing Jewish population while always ensuring "freedom and
equality"' 27 for all non-Jewish inhabitants. Sylvain Ldvi, President of
the Alliance in 1919, explained that:
It would be unconscionable to expel the Palestinians from the land where
they have lived for centuries to house Jews flocked from all parts of the
world. The current inhabitants have more rights on the ground than the
descendants of people dispersed for nearly two thousand years and which,
before the Christian era, were not established there unmemorable time.
Moreover, as the current population counts approximately 500,000 people
including 120,000 Jews, one does not see how, either by expelling the
Palestinians more or less in a friendly way, or by improving the methods
of cultivation, one could make a living for more than a tenth of the Jews
scattered in the world.128

The Zionists understood the Alliance's program for Palestine as a
plan for the "internationalization of Palestine."l 29 The Alliance,
Weizmann explained, fought in the name of universal principles and
"in the name of justice" aimed to defend all mankind and to "protect
the interests of the Arabs." 3 0 But this "internationalism" of Palestine,
in effect, "betrayed the national interests of the [Jewish] people."' 3 1
For Weizmann, this was "well, a form of idolatry," 3 2 indeed "a great
125. OSCAR I. JANOWSKY, THE JEWS AND MINORITY RJGHTS, 1898-1919 301
(1933) (quoting Nahum Ussischkin).
126.

EUGENE C. BLACK, THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF ANGLO-JEWRY, 1880-1920

385 (1988).
127. Sylvain Lvi, Presentation before the Supreme Allied Council on the
question of Palestine, Process-Verbal of 46th Session, Paris (February 27, 1919),
in IB THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 97, at 228.

128. Id.
129. Letter no. 351 from Chaim Weizmann to Louis D. Brandeis, in IB THE
LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 97, at 372.

130. Id.
131. Letter No. 128 from Chaim Weizmann to Moses Gaster, supra note 115, at
162-65.
132.

DAVID A. ANDELMAN, A SHATTERED PEACE: VERSAILLES 1919 AND THE

PRICE WE PAY TODAY 87 (2008).
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ChilulHashem [blasphemy]."
In direct contrast to the internationalization of Palestine, the
Zionists called for a Jewish nationalization of the land. At the Paris
Peace Conference's session on Palestine, Weizmann asked to ensure
conditions in Palestine that would "enable (them) to send immigrants
to Palestine . . ." and to "to develop our institutions, our schools and

our Hebrew language."l 3 4 Weizmann continued, if the Jewish
"nationality forms the majority of the population, then the moment
will have come to claim the government of the country""' and to
ultimately establish there a Jewish nation-state and make "Palestine
just as Jewish as America is American and England is English."l 36
While the Alliance believed that citizenship in a European-style
liberal state provided the best guarantee of safety and undertook a
collective fight for Jewish equality of rights, the Zionists held that
the only defense for the Jews was their own territorial political unit
in Palestine. Nahum Sokolov, a Polish writer and an important
Zionist leader, explained that even if Jews obtained equal rights in
Russia and Poland, still "there would most certainly be an acute
Jewish question even then" and the Jewish question would remain
"just as burning.". "The only solution of the problem," Sokolov
concluded, "was the Zionist solution along national lines.""' The
Zionists, therefore, made a return to Palestine the keystone of their
Jewish political program, deeming the issue of East European civil
rights less important or even irrelevant.
Despite the acrimonious relationship between the two movements,
the Alliance ironically played an important role in the ultimate
success of the Jewish national home. Much before the creation of the
State of Israel in 1984, or even the First Zionist Congress in 1897,
the Alliance schools had already radically transformed the condition

133. Chaim Weizmann, Report to London Zionist Conference (Mar. 5, 1919), in
97, at 235.
134. Id.
135. Notes Recorded at Proceedings Before the Supreme Allied Council (Feb.
27, 1919), in IB THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 97,
at 23 1.
136. Weizmann, supra note 133.
137. Notes of meeting held on Thursday February 8th 1917 at the residence of
Sir Mark Sykes, 9 Buckingham Gate, London W. from the American Jewish
Archives' Small Collection on Zionism (SC 13368-13376).
IB THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supranote
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of world Jewry. The schools taught individual Jews coming from the
ghettos of the Muslim East how to act as political persons and how to
function in the modem world. They instilled in the Jewish people as
a whole the idea of a Jewish unity that mobilized patterns of modem
political existence and gave legitimacy to a permanent Jewish
political movement. It was these foundations, established by the
Alliance in order to build a transnational political network that the
Zionists would later build upon and turn toward territorial and
national ends.'38
Furthermore, the Alliance schools, particularly those in Palestine,
unintentionally supplied some of the key practical foundations for
the success of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Alliance agricultural
schools and settlements taught the early Jewish settlers in Palestine
how to work the land. David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of
the State of Israel, captured the importance of the Alliance
agricultural schools for the Zionist project: "The creation of the State
was made possible by" the founding of the Alliance's schools in
Palestine. If the schools had not been founded, "[it is doubtful] that
the State of Israel could have come into being." 3 9 The Alliance also
played a key role in the revival of the Hebrew language. One of the
Alliance teachers, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, transformed the Hebrew
language using a similar method used in other Alliance schools
throughout the world. 14 0 Ben-Yehuda encapsulated the complex
relationship between the Alliance and Zionism by arguing that the
Alliance was "the bitterest enemy" of Zionism, but he also
recognized that the Zionists "owe [a] deep gratitude" to the Alliance
school "for reviving the Hebrew language."l41
While scholars have assumed that networks gain power at the
138. 1 am building here on GRAETZ, supra note 43, at 287 ("[E]specially owing
to the network of [Alliance] schools .

.

. the impetus to transform the base [of a

world body] was provided, and the idea of a modem Judaism that did not confine
its borders to a single country became more concrete.").
139. Ben Gurion refers to the Alliance's agricultural school, Mikveh Israel.
Silberman, supra note 23.
140. See JACK FELLMAN, THE REVIVAL OF A CLASsIcAL TONGUE: ELIEZER BEN
YEHUDA AND THE MODERN HEBREW LANGUAGE 49 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1973)
(explaining the method Ben-Yehuda used to teach Hebrew-"teaching Hebrew
through the medium of Hebrew itself'-which was a similar method to how
French was taught by the Alliance).
141. Id. at 48-49.
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expense of the state, the territorial and the transnational can in fact
interact in ways that are more complex and interdependent. The
complex relationships between the Alliance, the Zionists, and the
French state suggest that the transnational ethnic-religious network
and the territorial state can exploit each other in a multitude of
arrangements, and are to some extent defined by their interactions
with each other. Neither the state nor the network can permanently
exclude the other form from its ambit, and their relationships lead to
effects that are unpredictable over time.

II. THE STATE AND THE NETWORK AFTER
WORLD WAR I
A. THE PARIS PEACE TREATY AND THE MINORITIES TREATIES
The formalization of the international legal system that occurred at
the Paris Peace Conference at the conclusion of World War I had farreaching consequences for transnational networks like the Alliance,
which had flourished in the less rigid pre-war environment. Perhaps
surprisingly, the Alliance itself was a significant player in enacting
these legal changes. At the Conference, the Alliance sought to use
international legal discourse to carve out Jewish collective rights
while bypassing national avenues. Ultimately, however, the
network's lawmaking efforts at the international gathering in
Versailles assisted in systematizing the state form as the pragmatic
mold of political organization and in precluding the network from
achieving formal status at the international level.
The outcome of the Paris Peace Conference was seen, at the time,
as a major triumph for the Alliance. Although the transnational group
lacked any legal or political standing, it nonetheless played a
surprisingly active role in shaping outcomes, and even drafted major
legislation-a fact that has disappeared from the mainstream
narrative on the history of international law. Recounting the lobbying
role of the Alliance in Paris 1919 thus forces us to reconsider aspects
of the genealogy of the law. The primary goal of the Alliance at the
Conference was to ensure that the new states born in Central and
Eastern Europe would guarantee equal legal and political rights for
all inhabitants, regardless of religious or ethnic orientation.
Reluctantly, and as a concession to the clamor by Zionists about the
violent reality faced by the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, the
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Alliance added to its demands for individual citizenship a claim for
group minority rights, designed to secure cultural autonomy for all
minorities in the new states of Central and Eastern Europe.142
The Alliance submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference
Secretariat asking to force upon the new states national laws that
would remove all civil and political restrictions on their minorities
(protecting individual members of the group against discrimination)
and would award the minority, as a collectivity, positive group rights
distinct from those of the individuals composing it (protecting
against the cultural assimilation of the minority as a group as into the
majority).143 These positive group rights included cultural freedom
and, in particular, autonomy over the maintenance of schools and

religious education.144
The final draft of the Minorities Treaties "realised to the full" the
expectations of the Jewish network, in the words of one key Alliance
negotiator.' 45 The impact of the Alliance on the codification of the

142. The Alliance delegates explained:
[S]ince the Polish Jews were attached to their Yiddish dialect, any attempt to restrict
its use would inflict hardship upon them and would therefore be viewed as
persecution. On the other hand, if unmolested for about a quarter of a century, the Jews
... would assuredly abandon the jargon in favor of the language of the country.
JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 326. There is vast literature on the violent reality of

the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe at this time, see, e.g., Theodor Fritsch, The
Racists' Decalogue, in THE JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY
HIsTORY 287 (Paul Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1995) (describing the

call for German anti-Semitism towards German Jews).
143. See JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 324 (recounting the memorandum
submitted as calling for the assurance of citizenship with "equal civil and political
rights . . .").
144. See id at 324 ("The [memorandum] called for religious [and] educational .
. autonomy . . . [including a] provision urg[ing] that all religious and cultural

minorities should . .. [have rights] on a footing of equality.").
145. Lucien Wolf, Maccabaeans' dinner in honor of Lucien Wolf: invitation,
seating list, and Lucien Wolf s speech (June 8, 1920), p. 2 of the speech, YIVO
archives (Series I Lucien Wolf: Personal (folder 1; reel 1/1)). It is useful to
compare briefly the Alliance memorandum to the Peace Conference Secretariat
with the final draft of the Polish Minorities Treaty, which served as the test case.
As in the Alliance memorandum, the first category of rights in the Polish Treaty
(Articles 2-6) prevented discrimination against individuals. The second category of
rights (Articles 7-8 of the Polish Minorities Treaty), included linguistic and
cultural autonomy as well as institutional rights and awarded a minority both the
legal privilege and cultural space to remain a distinct group and a right of nonassimilation into the majority group.
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Treaties was also acknowledged from outside the network. The
Director of the Minorities Section of the League Secretariat
identified in 1920 the role of the "powerful Hebrew organizations" as
strong influences in the negotiation of the Minorities Treaties. 14 6
Historians have drawn similar conclusions.14 1
In order to compel the young states born across Central and
Eastern Europe to sign the Minorities Treaties, the Alliance exploited
the procedural doctrine of recognition, by which states and
international organizations formally recognize the juridical and
territorial autonomy of new entities on the international stage, legally
conveying sovereignty.148 Recognition was important for the young
states both as a legal acknowledgment that they exist as a matter of
international law and as a requirement for political and economic
relations with other states.14 9 The gap in power between the strong
Allied powers that could grant recognition and the new states that
sought formal acknowledgement provided the Alliance with an
opportunity to exploit this doctrine.
The Alliance consciously aligned its own interests in international
supervision of minority subjects in the new states with those of the
Allied states that could award recognition. The latter then coerced
new states into allowing a measure of international intervention in
their internal affairs in return for the Allied powers' extension of
international recognition of their independent juridical status. The
strategy was summed up by Lucien Wolf, the principal designer of
policy for the British Jewish Joint Foreign Committee, which
collaborated intimately with the Alliance in the effort:'1 0 the object
146. P. DE AZCARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN
EXPERIMENT 6 (Eileen E. Brooke trans., 1945).

147. See JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 385 ("[t]he Peace Conference was
induced, largely through the efforts of Jewish representatives, to guarantee ...
civil, political and religious equality).
148. For a discussion of the doctrine of recognition, see generally DAVID
KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 129-150 (1987) (highlighting the

importance of the recognition doctrine).
149. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 389-91 (Robert

W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966) (explaining the difference between legal and political
recognition for young states and why they are necessary conditions for
international relations).
150. Wolf explained that he and the Alliance were in "complete agreement" in
Paris 1919. See Lucien Wolf, Diary of Lucien Wolf (Jan. 15, 1919), p. 7, YIVO
archives (Series I Lucien Wolf: Personal (folder 6; reel/frame 1/387)).

2011]

STA TES AND NETWORKS

1277

was to limit "the right of Sovereignty" in its internal national and
"domestic relations."'

For this, "the Jewish question . . . cannot be

separated from the general political question."' 5 2
The following section briefly reviews four ways in which the
Alliance was able to align Jewish interests with those of the Allied
states in Versailles: (1) the Alliance's representatives carefully chose
the moment of their intervention in the peace negotiations; (2) the
network developed a well-coordinated operation with other Jewish
bodies from England and the United States; (3) the leaders of the
Alliance and their collaborators cultivated access to key people of
power in the various Allied states; and (4) the Alliance highlighted
the "extreme" Zionist demands in order to advance their own
relatively modest goals of equal civil, educational, and religious
rights. Each of these factors is discussed in some detail below.
The Alliance representatives carefully selected the right moment
for Jewish intervention in the international realm. Lucien Wolf
prepared for the eventual peace settlement on a full-time salaried
basis starting in 1915.1 He used the years of the First World War to
work his way "into the closest confidential relations with the Foreign
Office,"' 5 4 and by 1919 was able to "find out at any given moment
what was going on in the embassies and chancelleries of Europe."'
While gearing up since 1915, Wolf deliberately waited until the time
"for peace negotiations and the construction of the New Europe
arrives before pushing forward the issue of minority rights." "6In the
political and cultural confusion that prevailed at the Peace talks, the
Alliance enjoyed an advantage; the uncertain terrain favored the
bargaining skills and diplomatic experience of Wolf and the Alliance
negotiators.
At Versailles, the Alliance developed a well-coordinated operation
with other Jewish bodies from both sides of the Atlantic, including
the British Jewish Joint Foreign Committee and the American Jewish
151. Id. at 3.
152. MARK LEVENE, WAR, JEWS, AND THE NEW EUROPE: THE DIPLOMACY OF
LUCIEN WOLF, 1914-1919 12 (1992).

153. Id. at 43.
154. Id. at 44.
155. Id. at 46.
156. Letter from Lucien Wolf to Clara Melchior (Nov. 16, 1914), in LEVENE,
supra note 152, at 37.
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Delegation. The cooperation between the three groups allowed them
to share knowledge and information and to generate simultaneous
pressure-group politics with the different Allied powers. 1
The leaders of the Alliance, and their collaborators, also cultivated
access to people of power in the different Allied states. Of particular
benefit was the relationship between the members of the delegation
of the American Jewish Congress and Woodrow Wilson. The
American President and Justice Louis Brandeis were friends-and
Brandeis was partly responsible for Wilson's interest in Jewish
national or minority rights.' 58 Stephen Wise, one of the delegates in
the American Jewish Congress, was also a friend of Wilson and
arranged a meeting with the President before the trip to Paris. In the
meeting, Wilson committed himself:
Every one of the groups and peoples that are intolerant of the Jews is an
applicant to us for something, for some help and favor at our hands .... I
mean to insist that the thing we are discussing shall be written into the
new covenant that has to be made with every one of them. 5 9

The Jewish leaders presented Wilson a draft, modified by David
Hunter Miller, the leading American legal expert in Versailles, for
minority protection. This formula later appeared on the agenda of the
Supreme Council of the Allied leaders in Paris. Partially a
consequence of this Jewish draft formula, a new committee, the
"Committee on New States," was created in Paris with the mandate
to prepare the clauses for the protection of minorities. 6 0 The Alliance
was also able to exercise substantial influence over the working of
the Committee. Lucien Wolf cultivated a close friendship and
enjoyed nearly daily access to Sir James Headlam-Morley,' 6' the man
157. For this collaboration, see generally id. (highlighting the success of the
Alliance in generating pressure-group politics with other Allies). See also NAOMI
W. COHEN, NOT FREE TO DESIST; THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 1906-1966
102-122 (1972).
158. JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 255 (discussing the intimate relationship
between President Wilson and several Jewish leaders, many of whom constantly
pleaded for the protection of minorities).
159. COHEN, supra note 157, at 114.
160. LEVENE, supra note 152, at 282 (stating further that the creation of the
minority protection clauses represented the satisfaction of the international
obligations owed by the new states to the Allies).
161. David Hunter Miller, one of the two leading American legal experts in
Versailles, accused Headlam-Morley of supporting the Jewish cause "to the extent
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most responsible for laying out the foundations of the Minorities
Treaties. 16 2 Headlam-Morley would later formally thank Wolf for his
"great assistance" in drafting the Minorities Treaties. 163
Finally, Sylvain Ldvi and Lucien Wolf were able to use the
extreme Zionist demands as the "strongest weapon and best
arguments" 6 4 to advance their own relatively moderate demands for
equal civil, educational, and religious rights with all other
minorities-religious or ethnic. Wolf explained this strategy in his
diary: "the success of our negotiations . .. depends on the degree of

support we might get from the Allied governments against the
extreme demands of the Zionists." 6 5
In a presentation on the question of Palestine before the Supreme
Allied Congress, Sylvain L6vi publicly emphasized to the Allied
powers that the Zionists threatened the new world order on at least
three fronts. First, the Zionist claim for a Jewish national home in
Palestine was dangerous because it ignored that fact that an Arab
population already "exists on this soil" and that this soil "can now
only nourish a small population." 66 This, Lvi predicted, would lead
to a "disproportion between the area of Palestine and the hundreds of
thousands, probably millions, of human beings who aspire to find a

refuge there."

67

Second, the Zionists' claim for recognition as a national minority
in the new states in Central and Eastern Europe was "explosive"
of being willing to go further in favor of the Jews than . . . reasonable." See Diary
Entry of David Hunter Miller (May 13, 1919), in DAVID MILLER, MY DIARY AT
THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 306 (1919).
162. Headlam-Morley was the second of two permanent members of the
Committee on New States and the only representative that maintained an almost
constant presence throughout the Committee's 64 meetings. See SIR JAMES
HEADLAM-MORLEY, Extract from diary: Protection of minority rights in the new
states, in A MEMOIR OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 114 (Agnes
Headlam- Morley, Russell Bryant & Anna Cienciala, eds., 1972) (noting HeadlamMorley's appointment to the Committee on New States, along with a French
representative, Mr. Miller).
163. Wolf, supra note 150, at 6.
164. BLACK, supra note 126, at 383.
165. Lucien Wolf, Diary of Lucien Wolf (May, 1919), p. 122, YIVO archives
(Series I Lucien Wolf: Personal (folder 6; reel/frame 1/387)).
166. VII THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 115, at
228.
167. Id. at 227.
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because the Zionists were trying to invent a separate Jewish nation
within territories of already existing nations. 168 "[N]ations cannot be
improvised" 69 and should not "be created at will, and the realization
of a certain number of aspirations would not suffice to create a
national entity . . ."1o

Third, the Zionists were "singularly dangerous" within the Allied
states because they generated a larger juridical problem:
A formidable precedent, that of calling upon men, who in their own
countries exercise in full plentitude their rights of citizenship, to exercise
the same political rights in another country. It is . . . creating a class of

privileged citizens who would at the same time participate in all elections
in their own countries and who would be called besides to exercise
similar, if not identical, rights in a distant country where they surely could
not have direct interests, and which perhaps they could not even have
visited ... [The Zionists] demand for the Jews of Palestine privileges and
an exceptional Situation. Every exception always ends by reacting against
those who demand it and benefit from it.17 1

Against the explosive nature of Zionist demands, the Alliance and
the British Jewish Joint Foreign Committee defined their own claims
on behalf of world Jews in terms that comported with the liberal
international culture in Paris at the time.172 They presented their
particular organization "preoccupied with Jewish interests," 7 3 not as
a nation,174 but a religious association that was always "fully
168. Id. at 228.
169. Id. at 228.
170. Sylvain L6vi, Address to the Council of Ten in Paris (1919), in DAVID
HUNTER MILLER, MY DIARY AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIs 2-27 (1925).
171. 1 LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, Series B, 228 (Transactions
Books, Rutgers University, 1983).
172. On the liberal structure of international law, see INIS L., CLAUDE, JR.,
NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 18 (1955) ("[T]he rights of
minorities could be . . . secure only in a setting of . . . political liberalism.");
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 148 (2002) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS] (explaining that French foreign policy focused on

solidarity and autonomy). See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Nationalism,
Universalism, and Empire: International Law in 1871 and 1919 (Apr. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Nationalism].
173. GRAETZ, supra note 43, at 277.
174. See JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 296 (quoting Eugene S6e-one of the
Alliance representatives in Paris-explaining his categorical opposition to any
Jewish claims for national rights "because the word 'national' implies the existence
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conscious of its duties to the fatherland.""' At the same time, they
introduced themselves in their individual capacity. Ldvi referred to
himself in Versailles as a "Frenchman," and "a Jew by origin, that is
Jewish in sentiment, but French above all."1 7 6 Wolf, in turn, declared
that he understand himself to be a British citizen, an Englishman
before he was Jew."' The Alliance located their governing network
outside the statist-territorial form of political identity that was
institutionalized in Versailles, thereby ensuring a non-threatening
appearance at the Conference.
By building on the procedural doctrine of recognition and by
aligning their interests with those of the Allied powers, the Alliance
marched "triumphantly through the Paris Peace Conference, routing
East European Jewish nationalists and defining minority rights for
the peace settlements." 1 8 The Alliance had used international law as
a site- of power against the new states that emerged in Central and
Eastern Europe, structuring those states' relationships with their own
populations and within their own territorial boundaries. This power
to infringe upon the most basic sovereign right of nations went much
beyond what the Jewish network could have achieved through direct
negotiations with the new states. The extraordinary role played by
the Alliance, a transnational network, in the codification of new
international law stands in conflict with the common assumption that
only states make international law and compels us to rethink the
main lines of international legal history. It is all the more surprising
that the period beginning in the late nineteenth century and ending in
the 1940s is generally considered the heyday of national sovereignty
and a time that established the view that states alone could make law,
and only they are bound by it. But the lawmaking triumph of the
Alliance was also the beginning of the network's political undoing,
as the state-centered regime of the new treaties would ultimately
of a nation").
175. Abitbol, supra note 46, at 37.
176. U.S. DEP'T STATE, IV PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 (Government Printing

Office, 1943) (Secretary's notes of a conversation held in M. Pichon's room at the
Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Feb. 27, 1919, 3:00 PM)).
177. Szaz Szajkowski, Jewish Diplomacy - Notes on the Occasion of the
Centenary of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, 22 JEWISH Soc. STUD. 131-158,

136 (1960).
178. BLACK, supra note 126, n.51.
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leave network entities marginalized. Woodrow Wilson was most
responsible for pushing forward the doctrine of national selfdetermination; his rationale was political: an international attempt to
secure a lasting public order within stable and recognized territorial
frontiers." 9 Alas, the principle of nationalities could not extend to all
the populations of the area between Germany and Russia. The
unhappiness of these people denied self-determination and
membership in their natural nation-states provided, according to
Wilson, the "fertile sources of war." 8 0 The Minorities Treaties were
intended to domesticate the danger posed by people who now
belonged by citizenship to new states but by ethnic or religious
nationality to another state. The Treaties introduced a new protected
category, the "minority," as a way of allowing the ethnic and
religious "other" to enter the state-system of organization and to
reconcile with the territorial polities within which they found
themselves. By providing for the protection of minorities, the
Treaties allowed international law to sanction the creation of national
states, making the international protection of minorities "a strict and
logical corollary of the principle of self-determination of nations.""'
This legal compromise debuted in the Polish Minorities Treaty,
which served as the model for all subsequent Minorities Treaties.182
The Treaty of Versailles, which recognized the Polish state, and the

179. See Stephen D. Krasner, Explaining Variation: Defaults, Coercion,
Commitments, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL

POSSBILITIES 331 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (recounting Wilson's belief that

national self-determination was a necessary condition for international peace and
stating that the means by which to create ethnically homogenous states was to
"reconcile ethnic minorities to the polities within which they found themselves").
180. Tennent Harrington Baglay, The InternationalProtection of Minorities, in
MINORITIES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (Satish Chandra ed.,

1985).
181. Josef L. Kunz, The Present Status of the International Law for the
ProtectionofMinorities, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 282 (1954). This article's analysis
of the Minorities regimes benefits from the work of Nathaniel Berman. See, e.g.,
Berman, supra note 18; Nathaniel Berman, Between "Alliance" and
"Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &

POL. 449 (1994) [hereinafter Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Localization"];
Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair": European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of InternationalLaw, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1792 (1993)
[hereinafter Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair"].
182. Polish Minority Protection Treaty, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 412
[hereinafter Polish Minority Treaty].
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Minorities Treaty were signed on the same day, signaling that Polish
sovereignty was conditioned upon Poland's agreement to protect its
minorities.' 83
The minority system consisted of sovereign states bound by
obligations to certain categories of individual citizens. The Preamble
of the Polish Minorities Treaty declared the "restor[ation] of the
Polish nation" and the consequent international recognition of Poland
as a "sovereign and independent State."I8 4 At the same time, the
Treaty stipulated that individuals within Polish territory belonging to
"racial, religious or linguistic minorities" would receive equal state
citizenship and mandated removal of all civil and political
restrictions on individual members of the minorities.185
While the state was recognized as a subject of the law with direct
cause of action on the international realm, and while even the
individual was awarded an indirect right of action, the minority itself
was structured as a cultural entity housed within the state and lacking
political autonomy and legal identity. Articles 7-9 of the Polish
Minorities Treaty extended religious, educational and cultural
autonomy to the minority and legalized the cultural difference of the
minority as a group in the new Polish constitution. But these group
rights "were limited to the minimum," in the words of Georges
Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France. Clemenceau emphasized that
the Treaties were tailored so as not "to create any obstacle to the
political unity of Poland" and that the minority was explicitly barred
from organizing itself as "a separate political community." 8 6 Article
11 of the Polish Minorities Treaty, moreover, established a clear
hierarchical relationship between the minority's cultural rights and
the larger political state. While recognizing a Jewish collective right
to observe the Sabbath, the Article subjugated this collective right to
the interests of the state, and specified that "necessary purposes of

183. The Permanent Court of International justice in the Polish Nationality Case
explained: "Poland ... at the moment of her final recognition as an independent
state and at the elimination of her frontiers, signed provisions which established a
right to Polish nationality . . . ." Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory
Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15 (Sept. 15).
184. Polish Minority Treaty, supra note 182.
185. Id. arts. 206.
186. For Clemenceau's letter, see M. Clemenceau, Letter ofJune 24, 1919, to M
Paderewski, 13 SUPPLEMENT AM. J. INT'L. L. 416 (1919).
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military service, national defence or the preservation of the public
order" trumped the Sabbath right.' Sir James Headlam-Morley
captured the unequal relationship between the two forms of
organizing identity: "the territorial sovereignty of the state is the
basis of our whole political system.""8 Within this framework, the
"minority" was "extremely moderate" in its demands for rights. 89 In
fact, Headlam-Morley went so far as to explain that even if the denial
of rights to minorities "might lead to injustice and oppression, that
was better than to allow anything which would mean the negation of
the sovereignty of every state in the world." 9 0
The invention at Versailles of a new legal category of identitythe "minority"-might have led to some sort of formal recognition of
transnational ethnic and/or religious networks, especially as one such
network played a significant role in devising the new system.
However, the interests of the states precluded the recognition of such
entities, and the rights of minorities were carefully defined to fall
short of political independence and legal sovereignty outside the
confines of their host state. The effect of the dual legal instruments
of the Minorities Treaties and the Peace Treaty (recognizing the right
of self-determination) was to exclude the Alliance and other
transnational networks of the time from the newly formalized
international legal system.
B. RULINGS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE

While the new regime denied minority groups direct status and
formal standing in international forums, the legal framework was still
open to multiple possible interpretations. Importantly, it was not yet
resolved whether the ultimate object of the new order was to ensure
the "gradual and painless assimilation" of the minority (the "Franco-

187. Polish Minority Treaty, supra note 182.
188. A.A. Young, Commercial Policy in German, Austrian, Hungarian, and
Bulgarian Treaties, in 5 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 137
(H.W.V. Temperley ed., 1921).
189. Sir James Headlam-Morley, Letter to Sir Maurice Hankey, in A MEMOIR
OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919, supra note 162, at 105-106.
190. Sir James Headlam-Morley, Extract from diary. Protection of minority
rights in the new states, in A MEMOIR OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919,
supra note 162, at 113.
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Melon thesis") or the indefinite preservation of the minority as an
"other."l 9 ' In 1920, the League of Nations set up the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), the first permanent
international tribunal with general obligatory jurisdiction, and gave
the Court a mandate to clarify legal issues relating to the
implementation of the new system.' 92 The decisions of the Court
institutionalized the legal order, determined its nature, and "made a
tangible contribution to the development and clarification of the rules
and principles of international law."' 9 The Permanent Court was
replaced after World War II by the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), an organ of the United Nations. The ICJ retained almost
unchanged the statutes of the PCIJ, and the two courts maintained a
continuity of jurisdiction.194
This section surveys four cases that came before the PCIJ during
the 1920s and '30s under the Minorities regime, focusing in
particular on those rulings affecting minority schools. These are: the
Minority Schools in Albania case, concerning the right of minorities
to run private schools under the terms of the Minorities Treaties;195
the Acquisition of Polish Nationalities case, investigating the
citizenship rights of persons of German origin in the new Polish
state; 196 the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, a case dealing
with questions of schooling and the linguistic identity of the

191. For a discussion on the differences between the doctrine of gradual
minority assimilation and the doctrine of preservation of the minority, see, e.g.,
Baglay, supra note 180, at 182-86 (discussing assimilation of minority groups, and
the differences between permanent assimilation and a gradual, transient process).
192. For a discussion of the International Court of Justice, its organization,
competence, procedures and Advisory Opinions, see generally BARRY E. CARTER,
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 324-34 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 2007); KELSEN, supra note 149, at 532-546.
193. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 5 (Stevens & Sons Ltd., rev. ed. 1958).
194. See id. at 3 ("[In] effect, the [International Court of Justice] is a
continuation of the [Permanent Court of International Justice] . . . ."); see also F. P.

A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 170-171 (1952) ("[T]he new
International court set up by the United Nations is almost an exact reproduction of
the Permanent Court set up by the League.").
195. Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 64, at 4 (Apr. 6).
196. Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 7, at 6 (Sept. 15).
WALTERS,
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minority;m' and finally, the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case,
which asked whether minorities protections bestowed legal and
political status on non-state groups and whether they accorded such
"communities" a special relationship to the pertinent kin-state. 198
The Minority Schools in Albania case dealt with a dispute between
Albania and Greece over Articles 206-207 of the Albanian
Constitution (1933), which abolished all private schools in the
country, including minority schools, and demanded that the
education of all Albanian subjects be "reserved to the State and ...
given in State schools." 99 Greece brought the suit against Albania (a
signatory to the Minorities Treaties), in support of the Greek
minority living in that country. 200 The Greek case rested on Article 5
of the Albanian Declaration (1921), which guaranteed to minorities
in Albania "the same treatment and security in law and in fact as
other Albanian nationals." 201 Greece claimed that equality in fact
demanded a different treatment of minority schools from that of state
schools.202 Albania, however, argued that because its abolition of
private schools constituted a general measure applicable to the
majority as well as the minority, it was in conformity with the
obligations it undertook to grant minorities the same treatment in law
as that granted to other Albanian nationals.2 03
In its Advisory Opinion, the Court rejected the plea of the
Albanian government and found in favor of the Greek minority's
right to run private schools, even if such schools were not permitted
for the majority population. The judges explained that "[t]he idea
underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities" was to give
an international guarantee to maintain the "very essence" of being a
197. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger. v. Pol.),
Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15, at (Apr. 26). On the unique legal reality in
Upper Silesia, see generally Berman, But the Alternative is Despair, supra note
181, at 1893-98 (examining the fifteen year history of the partition of Upper Silesia
between Germany and Poland).
198. Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal
Emigration (Question of the "Communities"), Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 17, at 5 (Jul. 31).
199. ALBANIAN CONSTITUTION, Dec. 1, 1928, arts. 206-207.
200. Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 64, at 7-8 (Apr. 6).
201. THE ALBANIAN DECLARATION OF OCT. 2, 1921 art. 5 (1921).
202. Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. at 12.
203. Id. at 15.
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minority. 20"This protection was designed to ensure the possibility of
the minority and majority "living peaceably" alongside one another
and "co-operating amicably," attaining an "equilibrium."" The
terms of the coexistence guaranteed the minority the right to develop
"the characteristics which distinguish [the minority] . . . from the

majority," and prohibited the state from adopting "a privileged
situation as compared with the minority," because that would mean
"there would be no true equality." 206
To secure an equilibrium between the minority and majority, the
Court declared that two conditions must be met: first, the minority
must be guaranteed "suitable means for the preservation of their
racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics;"
and second, the minority must be "placed in every respect on a
footing of perfect equality" with the majority. 20 7 The latter included
assuring "equality in fact," not just "equality in law," between the
minority and majority populations.2 08 The Court found that "equality
in fact" "may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to
attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different
situations.20 9 The two conditions, equality and perseveration of
special qualities, were "closely interlocked;" the judges explained
that the satisfaction of both necessitated that the minority enjoy selfrule over its "charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools and
other educational establishments . . . ."210 Depriving the minority of
these institutions would mean compelling it to also "renounce that
which constitutes the very essence of its being as a minority."2 11 The
Court declared that:
[Separate minority schools alone could] satisfy the special requirements
of the minority groups, and their replacement by government institutions
would destroy this equality of treatment, for its effect would be to deprive
the minority of the institutions appropriate to its needs, whereas the
majority would continue to have them supplied in the institutions created

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. at 17.
Id. at 17, 19.
Id. at 17, 20.
Id. at 17.
See generally id. at 18-20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 17, 19.
Id. at 17.
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by the State.212

While the decision guaranteed the right of the minority to maintain
its special essence and way of life, the Court contained this zone of
freedom within the limited realm of culture and culture-building
institutions such as "charitable, religious, and social institutions,
schools and other educational establishments."2 13 Outside the cultural
realm, the judges declared that the minority was an entity
"incorporated in a State." 2 14 As a status within a state, the freedom of
the minority was always fundamentally enclosed within a larger
frame of territorial homogeneity. This decision awarded the minority
rights to define and sustain its essence, and privileged the institutions
it deemed responsible for fostering this essence, but explicitly
located the minority within statist territorial boundaries.2 15
The Minority Schools in Albania ruling left unresolved the limits

between the separate cultural life of the minority and the common
political system shared by the minority and majority (presumably
including elements such as foreign relations, military, etc.).
Moreover, even within the limits of the cultural realm, the Court did
not define the precise nature of the independence that the minority
was guaranteed. Minority cultural practices fall upon a continuum in
terms of their potential to generate conflict with the state. Some
practices, such as holidays, folk songs, or dietary restrictions, are less
likely to generate conflict, while others may overlap significantly
with the public realm of the state, or destabilize the state's project of
market unification. For example, a religious ritual that circumscribes
the place of girls in schools can impede a state project to promote
gender equality. While the court decided that private minority
schools must be permitted, it did not address the question of state
regulation of private schools. The ruling suggested that the
sovereignty of the State should not be more favorably treated than
the right of the minority,2 16 which may appear to suggest complete
212. Id. at 20.
213. Id. at 17, 19.
214. Id. at 17.
215. See id. (reasoning that one of the ideas underlying the treaties for the
protection of minorities is to ensure for minorities the preservation of racial
traditions and national characteristics).
216. Id. at 22 (finding it unnecessary to examine the argument put forth by the
Albanian government that the text of Article 5 should be interpreted in a manner
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independence for minority schools. But the Court also wrote that the
state could supply the minority with "something additional to private
education," though it is "not meant to take the place of private
education,"2 17 hinting at the permissibility of some regulation. These
vague statements ultimately provide no guidance on either the
minority's right to use its educational institutions to compete with the
state as a socializing force, or on the state's freedom to encroach
upon minority education through the regulation of private schools.
In the Acquisition of Polish Nationalities case, Poland sought to
exclude persons of German origin from Polish nationality, arguing
that as a sovereign state it had exclusive jurisdiction over its
domestic affairs, including defining the criteria for citizenship.2 1 8
Further, as non-citizens, those individuals of German descent living
in Poland would not be eligible for any special status or rights as a
protected minority. 219 In response, Germany argued that, under the
terms of the Minorities Treaty, these German inhabitants of Poland
were guaranteed Polish nationality.220
In its decision, the Court found that the simultaneous signing of
the Peace Treaty (recognizing Polish sovereignty) and the Minorities

that is most favorable to the state).
217. Id.
218. Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 7, at 16 (Sept. 15).
219. For Poland,"Polish nationality of the persons concerned must be
established before they constitute a minority within the meaning of the Minorities
Treaty." Id. at 22.
[A] person must be a Polish national in order to belong to a minority within the
meaning of the Treaty. . .. [P]ersons of German origin cannot be considered as Polish
nationals, since the question to be decided is whether ... they do or do not possess this
status.
Id. at 13.
220. Since Germany was not a signatory of the Minorities Treaty, Germany
could not technically defend German minority rights in Poland. The Court decided
to undertake the protection of the minority community in this case since there was
no other official representative on behalf of Germans in Poland. The only
"German" arguments come from the judges themselves.
[T]he Minorities Treaty seems thus to show that, in so far as these Articles establish a
right on the part of persons of German origin to Polish nationality, this right is placed
under the guarantee of the League of Nations: which is specially fitted to undertake the
protection of the persons of German origin referred to in the Minorities Treaty, to
which Germany was not a signatory.
Id. at 16.
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Treaties (Poland's obligation to its minorities) meant that the
definitions of both Poland and its population were established under
international law. 22 1 This gave the Court, as an international organ,
the authority to define the content of Polish nationality. In exercising
this power, the Court held that the conception of a "Polish nationals"
in Poland included all Polish inhabitants of non-Polish origins as
long as they were born in Poland and born to "parents habitually
resident there."22 2 Under this definition, the Court held that those
people of German origin were indeed a Polish minority and were
entitled to citizenship rights.223
In exercising its prerogative to define Polish citizenship, the Court
seemed to ignore any transnational political ties of the German
minority to its kin state.224 The judges held that any links which
"effectively" connect "persons belonging to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities ... to the territory allocated to one or other of
these states" are irrelevant. In fact, the law attaches no "importance
to the political allegiance of these persons." 225 The Court
internationalized control over the sovereignty of Poland and the
definition of its citizenship, but at the same time structured
international law so that it was blind to the political links of
transnational networks.
The Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia case concerned another
clash between Germany and Poland, after Poland disqualified the
application of a large number of children who wished to enroll in the
German minority schools in Polish Upper Silesia as part of a larger
battle over the linguistic identity of the area.226 The dispute came
under the Geneva Convention (1922)227 signed between Germany
and Poland, which included a scheme for the protection of minorities
221. Id. at 14.
222. Id. at 20.
223. Id. at 21.
224. Inis Claude defines "kin-state" as "A state which regard itself as standing in
a special relationship to a national minority in another state, by reason of ethnic
affinity." CLAUDE, supra note 172, at 5. More on the kin state debate, see generally
id. at 44-47; Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair",supra note 181, at 1832-34.
225. Acquisition ofPolish Nationality, 1923 P.C.I.J. at 15.
226. For more on the international experiment in Upper Silesia, see Berman, But
the Alternative is Despair,supra note 18 1, at 1893-98.
227. Convention Between Germany and Poland Relating to Upper Silesia, Pol.Ger., May 15, 1922, 9 L.N.T.S. 466.
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similar to that of the Minorities Treaties.
Article 106 of the Convention stated that minority schools would
be established in a particular location if there were at least forty
children "belonging to a linguistic minority," 228 and Article 107
provided for minority language courses in regular schools on the
demand of at least eighteen children "who belong to a linguistic
minority." 22 9 Article 131 (1) specified the parameters for deciding
whether a child had the right to such minority instruction: "in order
to determine the language of a pupil or a child, account shall be taken
of the verbal or written statement of the person legally responsible
for the education of the child. This statement may not be verified or
disputed by the authorities."230 The question before the Court was
whether the legal principles established in Article 131(1) set an
objective or subjective test for linguistic identity.23'
Poland, relying on the objective language of Articles 106 and 107,
argued that the Article 131(1) should be read as creating an objective
test for linguistic identity.2 3 2 This meant that the declaration of a
parent or guardian of a child should comport with a factual reality
and not reflect "the expression of an intention or of a wish." 233
Germany, in contrast, focused on the strict prohibition against
verification in the language of Article 131(1), and claimed that the
question of linguistic identity "must be left to the subjective
For
expression of the intention of the persons concerned. ...
Germany, this individual intention was not subject to dispute and
"must be respected by the authorities even where it appears to be
contrary to the actual facts."235
228. Id. art. 106; Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger.
v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15, at 36 n.1 (Apr. 26).
229. Convention Between Germany and Poland Relating to Upper Silesia, supra
note 227, art. 107; Rights of Minoritiesin Upper Silesia, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 39.
230. Convention Between Germany and Poland Relating to Upper Silesia, supra
note 229, art. 131(1) (emphasis added); Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, 1928
P.C.I.J. at 37.
231. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 34-35, 37-39. For a
detailed discussion of the case, see Berman, Between "Alliance" and
"Localization", supra note 181, at 1537-47.

232. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 39.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 32.
235. Id. The initial objection was made by Deutscher Volksbund fur Polnisch
Oberschlesien, an organization claiming to represent the German minority.

1292

AM. UINTL. REV.

[26:5

The ruling of the Court in Upper Silesia stated that parents, or
legal guardians, were the sole entities entitled to declare whether or
not the child "belong[s] to a racial, linguistic or religious
minority." 23 6 But the Court emphasized that this declaration must
reflect the "de facto" reality of the situation; indeed, if the
declaration did not correspond to facts then the Treaty "would fail in
its purpose."2 37 In any case, this parental right to decide the identity
of the child was not subject to dispute on the part of the state. 238 The
result was an indeterminate ruling: for the Court, the right of the
parents to declare their child's identity was "free" but not
"unrestricted;" it was based on the parents' "consciousness" but had
to reflect the "true position" of the identity.239 The decision framed
the relationship between the minority and the state in terms of a
conflict of rights between the state and an individual, rather than a
community body. The court provided the individual an entitlement
against the state, in this case to declare the identity of children and to
select the nature of their linguistic education.
Unlike the Minority Schools in Albania decision, the holding of
the Upper Silesia case did not use the word "equilibrium." Yet the
same logic of separation between the minority and majority within a
single political-territorial frame is apparent in both rulings. In the
Upper Silesia case, the court appears to envision a form of
equilibrium based upon linguistic criteria: German and Polish
speaking communities that live side-by-side within a single political
entity and whose children are either completely separated through
distinct schools or partly-divided by language instruction in general
schools.

236. Id. at 46-47.
237. Id. at 33.
238. The Court held that:
[The German-Polish Convention concerning Upper Silesia of May 1922] bestow[ed]
upon every national the right freely to declare according to his conscience and on his
personal responsibility that he does or does not belong to a racial, linguistic or
religious minority and to declare what is the language of a pupil or child for whose
education he is legally responsible . . . . [The decisions on] the question whether a
person does or does not belong to a racial, linguistic or religious minority, are subject
to no verification, dispute, pressure or hindrance whatever on the part of the
authorities.

Id. at 46-47.
239. Id. at 46.
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While the Minority Schools in Albania case provided no
substantive guidelines on state regulation of minority schooling, the
Upper Silesia ruling in fact suggests a limit on state interference. The
Court explained that a regulatory regime to verify linguistic identity
will not be effective because the authenticity of a person's
declaration does "not clearly appear from the facts." 24 0 As such, "if
the authorities wish to verify or dispute the substance" of individual
identity "it is very unlikely that. .. [they] reach a result more nearly
corresponding to the actual state of facts." 24 1 Indeed regulations may
even be positively dangerous and "any verification or dispute on the
part of the authorities" risks "inflam[ing] political passions" and
"counteract[ing] the aims of pacification." 2 42
Finally, the Greco-Bulgarian Communities case concerned the
Convention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal
Emigration (1919).243 which required its parties to "facilitate by all
means" the "right[s] of those of their subjects who belong to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities to emigrate freely to their respective
territories." 2 44 The parties agreed to permit emigrants to transport
their moveable property and to pay for the liquidation of immovable
property. Property covered by the Convention included that both
belonging to individuals and that owned by communities, in those
"cases where the right of emigration is exercised by members of
communities (including churches, schools, convents, hospitals or
foundations of any kind whatsoever) which on this account shall
have to be dissolved."245
The dispute turned on Article 6 of the Greco-Bulgarian
Convention 24 6 and concerned the parameters for determining the
legal existence of such communities, what property communities can
materially possess and liquidate, and who decides when a community
is dissolved after it emigrates. 247 Bulgaria argued that the community
240. Id. at 34.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal
Emigration, Greece-Bulg., Nov. 27, 1919, 1 L.N.T.S. 67.
244. Id. at 68-69.
245. Id. at 70.
246. Id.
247. Interpretation of Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting
Reciprocal Emigration, Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 5 (July
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should be defined by objective criteria and be recognized by state
law.2 48 Greece, however, claimed that the existence of the community
was a matter of fact based on subjective ethnic criteria, and was
independent of recognition by the law of the territorial sovereign.249
In its decision, the Permanent Court provided a legal structure for
a "community":
a group of persons living in a given country or locality having race,
religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this identity
... with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of
worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering
mutual assistance to each other. 250

The Court supported Greece's position and declared that the
existence of a minority "community," as an entity separate from the
individuals that composed it, "is a question of fact," not a question of
state law. 2 5 1 The Court, moreover, provided such communities with
specific property rights and declared that "churches, convents,
schools, hospitals or foundations existing as distinct entities are,
when the persons who are members or beneficiaries thereof emigrate,
assimilated to communities. "252
In accepting the existence and rights of the "community" as a
collective that mediated between the "state" and "individuals," the
judges acknowledged that their decision broke away from the
tradition of denying legal recognition and special rights to minority
communities in favor of either state rights or individual rights. The
Permanent Court explained this deviation by highlighting the
exceptional nature of the case. The judges gave the "community"
legal recognition because of the importance of collective identity in
"Eastern countries."25 3 It was this "tradition" of "sentiment[s] of
solidarity" which played "so important a part in Eastern countries"
and that provided "East individuals . . . of the same race, religion,

31).
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

For the submission of the Bulgarian government, see id. at 14-16.
For the submission of the Greek government, see id. at 16-19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 21.
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language and traditions" with "material benefits from time
immemorial" that justified their unusual legal treatment. 254 But even
in this exceptional case, the judges awarded the community
international legal recognition only upon its dissolution, when
individual members of the community emigrated to their racially
akin state, where they would no longer live as minorities.255
Moreover, while the Court made an exception and recognized the
legal status of the community, what the judges in the case ultimately
protected was the collective property of the community that was
"assimilated to individual property."25 6 For the Court, the "individual
members of the community, and they alone," were the subjects that
could "carry away the movable property of the community and
receive the value of its immovable property." 25 7
Reviewing these cases together reveals the particular vision of
minority status held by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
In Minority Schools in Albania, the Court nationalized the
community into a status incorporated within a state and placed it
behind the veil of sovereignty, outside the prerogatives of
international law. 258 The minority as a collectivity was excluded from
international legal identity. In Polish Nationalities, the Permanent
Court also unequivocally prohibited any ethnic network, now
redefined as a minority, from transnational political ties to their kin
across territories, treating the cross-border political allegiance of the
minority as irrelevant. 25 9 This further prevented a minority from
254. Id. at 20-21.
255. The judges explained:
If it is borne in mind that the object of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention was to
facilitate the emigration of individuals to the country to which they are racially akin,
that the Convention provides for the dissolution of communities precisely because of
this emigration and that, in order to encourage individuals to emigrate, it affords them
the possibility, conditional upon their emigration, of benefiting individually form the
property of the community. . . .
Id. at 26.
256. Id. at 21.
257. Id. at 27.
258. See generally Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64 (Apr. 6) (granting Albanian minorities the right to
establish various social institutions where they can exclusively work to exercise
preserve their culture and religion).
259. See generally Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15 (Sept. 15) (interpreting Article 4 of the Minorities
Treaty as referring only to the habitual residences of parents during the date of
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achieving political standing within the international realm. The one
exception made was in the Communities case, where the Court
legally recognized communities with a tradition of collective identity
in "Eastern countries," but even this recognition was awarded only
upon the dissolution of the community.26 0
Within the state framework, the case law assumed a static and
idealized equilibrium between the minority and the majority. The
decisions described two distinct cultural entities living peacefully
side-by-side, each developing its own unique essence and the
characteristics which distinguish it from the other, neither enjoying
"a privileged situation."26 ' The case law failed to consider the
potentially destabilizing effect of the economy and the workings of
the market on this static coexistence. Further, the existing rulings did
not consider the possibility that either the state or the minority might
threaten this idealized equilibrium. The state can claim its authority
to assimilate the youth of the minority into its own national culture,
and use regulations to restrict the minority's autonomy in education
(for example, mandating the minority to employ teachers from the
majority population or requiring a particular perspective on national
history to be taught). The minority could use its private schools to
interfere with core elements of the state project (for instance,
disseminating religious education that challenges secular democratic
government). The minority, moreover, could also reconfigure the
terms of the equilibrium. For example, instead of cultural autonomy
and political unification, as envisioned in the Minority Schools in
Albania case, a minority could decide to opt out politically,
culturally, and economically, living in isolation from the majority
institutions. A minority could also drop out culturally but still seek to
influence the public sphere, or withdraw politically but mobilize the
illegal economy, etc. 26 2
birth of the child at issue).
260. See generally Interpretation of Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration (Question of the "Communities"), Advisory
Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17 (Jul. 31).
261. See Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. at 20.
262. For example, in place of using language to reflect identity (as envisioned in
the Upper Silesia case), individuals could follow a different logic in making
decisions about language of instruction. One dissenting judge in the Upper Silesia
ruling pointed out that Polish parents who realize that their child "will
automatically learn Polish, the language of the country," can wish "for practical
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The case law incentivized a minority to either completely opt out
or completely assimilate into the state's cultural life. The law offered
no incentives for a partial collaboration designed to generate a new
joint collective "essence" that would reflect the interests and needs of
both people-the sort of model embraced by the Alliance. The
Alliance had generated a dual system of political loyalties: a positive
commitment to a transnational religious community that called for
joint action on the basis of obligations transcending land, combined
with the rights and obligations of individual citizenship, structured as
a legal bond with the state. But the new system defined no legal
instruments or conceptual space to accommodate a transnational
network that sought to collaborate with states across boundaries and
to support the needs and interests of its members while also
promoting loyalty to the political identity of the state.
The new political reality on the ground was that exclusive
occupation of land became essential for a people to claim the power
to control their own destiny. The transnational ethnic and/or religious
network was no longer permitted to exercise political powers across
territories. In a system that rooted the binding force of the law in
territorial sovereignty, the network was dispossessed of legal status.
A prominent international scholar explained in 1925 that claims of
legal rights by non-state people are "internationally unrecognized."2 63
The legal regime that was born after 1919 and institutionalized by
the PCIJ in the 1920s and 30s presented the Jews, like all other
ethnic and/or religious minorities, with the same two choices that are
today open to minorities that seek to maintain their distinct culture as
an ethnic-religious self. One on hand, they could repress political
aspirations and enjoy the rights of a "minority" with some poorly
defined cultural autonomy under the framework of larger political
representation through their host states. This type of cultural
independence is confined to the private realm within territorial state
borders and includes an unspecified measure of freedom over
schools and other culture-building institutions. Alternatively, those
who did not want to give up formal political independence could

reasons to have him instructed in the German language in a minority school."
Rights of Minoritiesin Upper Silesia, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 64.
263. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (A.
Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924).
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battle to establish exclusive control over territory. Under the new
order, securing group rights and group political power required
territorial self-determination. As Headlam-Moreley explained in
1919:
[I]f there was to be a Jewish nationality it could only be by giving the
Jews a local habitation and enabling them to found in Palestine a Jewish
state . .. any Jew, however, who became a national of a Jewish State
would naturally ipso facto cease to be a Polish citizen. 264

This is the paradox of the Alliance's role in the Paris Peace
Conference. Organized as a network and without formal political
power, the group was nonetheless able to mobilize the normative
power of international law to enact measures both to protect the
status of Jews in the newly formed states and to guarantee the
independence of Jewish cultural institutions (the locus of its own
transnational form of political power). However, in exploiting
international law, the Alliance also took part in recognizing the
primacy of the territorial state form and codifying a formal legal
framework that would render its own network mode politically
invisible and legally powerless.
At Versailles, the leaders of the Alliance joined representatives of
other networks (some seeking territory and some not),265 as well as
modem states and decaying empires. Out of this variegated cultural
and political landscape, only the state emerged as a sanctioned form
for the political organization of human community. The law provided
the meanings and narratives that authorized the state as the normative
form of organizing ethnic and/or religious political identity, denied
264. Young, supra note 189, at 137.
265. There were other networks that came to Paris. For example, on African and
African-American networks, see generally W.E.B. DU Bois, IN BATTLE FOR PEACE
THE STORY THE STORY OF MY 83RD BIRTHDAY (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 2007)
(narrating Du Bois's efforts to improve African rights); Clarence G. Contee, Du
Bois, the NAACP, and the Pan-African Congress of 1919, 57 J. NEGRO HIST. 13,
13-28 (1972) (cataloging DuBois' efforts to improve rights for Africans); John D.
Hargreaves, Maurice Delafosse on the Pan-African Congress of 1919, 1 AFR.
HIST. STUD. 233 (1968) (outlining the major interested parties in attendance at the
Pan-African Congress in Paris). On women networks in Paris 1919, see, e.g.,
CHARLES DEBENEDETTI, THE PEACE REFORM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 108-11
(1980);
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legal reality to the network, and simultaneously justified this status
as an a priorinatural fact.

III.THE DECLINE OF THE ALLIANCE IN A WORLD
OF NATION-STATES
The triumph of statehood as a political principle and the
consolidation of power within territorial parameters that occurred in
the aftermath of World War I were not lost on either the Muslim
world or the Jewish people. Increasingly, the transnational political
model of the Alliance came under attack, both from within the
Jewish community and from without. This section surveys the
transformations in legal structures and attitudes that squeezed the
Alliance out of existence. It starts with an examination of changing
laws in one representative location-Turkey, an important center of
Alliance operations. During the transition to statehood, Turkey
enacted a series of laws that upset the equilibrium between the state
and minority populations-an equilibrium that had been remarkably
stable under Ottoman rule. This created an environment that was
increasingly inhospitable to ethnic or religious minorities, and
ultimately turned inimical to the survival of the Alliance. This
section continues with an analysis of the shifting loyalties of Alliance
students and the rise of Zionism.
A. THE TURKISH REPUBLIC AND MINORITY SCHOOLS
Upon the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish government
immediately embarked on a process of unification, following the
French Jacobin model in the construction of a state apparatus that
tolerated no intermediaries between the citizenry and the state.26 6 As
the Turkish state became more assertive within its physical
boundaries, it increased its efforts to nationalize all groups under its
rule. In order to create a unified citizenry, Turkey broke away from
the long tradition of the millet and extended state control over the
cultural field.267

266. See N1YAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 477
(1st ed. 1964) (tracing the idea of the unification of the educational system to the
elections of 1923).
267. Id. at 477-78 (suggesting that secularizing education impacted politics and
the legal system in addition to the educational system).
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Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923),268 which led to
the international recognition of the new Republic of Turkey, the state
granted cultural autonomy to the Jews and other minorities. 2 69 Article
41 Section III of the Treaty, Protection of Minorities, guaranteed the
minorities an exception from state schooling requirements, granting
them the right to control education and provide schooling in their
own language. 27 0 But through a series of laws that the Republic
passed in its early years, Turkey slowly extended state control over
education to include minority schools, closing off the space for the
Alliance to collaborate with the state in educating Jews.271
In May 1923, the Turkish Ministry of Education made the
teaching of Turkish language, history, and geography compulsory in
all the non-Muslim schools.2 72 These subjects had to be taught in
Turkish by "pure Turks" appointed by the Ministry. 273 The "pure
Turk" teachers received a salary set by the Ministry which was
substantially higher than regular teachers, resulting in a heavy
financial burden for minority schools.27 4 The state also increased its
administrative oversight over minority schools. In 1923, for instance,
two inspectors from the Ministry of Education challenged the
operation of Alliance Schools in Edirne, a dispute that the governor
of the region used to close down all the Alliance schools in the

area. 275
268. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 38 L.N.T.S. 11.
269. Id. art. 37-45.
270. Id. art. 41.
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and
districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident,
adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be
given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own
language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the
teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

Id.
271. See RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 171.
272. See RODRIGUE, supra note 22, at 273 (quoting the notice from which
people were made aware of the new language requirements).
273. RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 163 (noting that Muslims were viewed as
"pure Turks").
274. Id. (comparing non-Muslim and Muslim schools); RODRIGUE, supra note
22, at 271 (illustrating the gap in wealth between the national and Alliance
schools).
275.

RIFAT N. BALI, CUMHURIYET YILLARINDA TORKIYE YAHUDILERI: BIR
[REPUBLICAN TURKEY MURDERED THE

TORKLESTIRME SERUVENI 1923-1945
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A year later, in 1924, the Turkish state banned the Alliance
schools from maintaining any links with "foreign organization[s]."276
This law prevented the Jewish network from directing its schools in
Turkey from the organization's center in Paris. From this point on,
the Alliance schools could only be managed and run locally from
Turkey, effectively ending the legal existence of the transnational
Jewish network in that country. Later in the same year, Turkey
presented the Alliance schools with an ultimatum: the schools could
use as their language of instruction either Turkish or the Jewish
national language, which the Ministry of Public Instruction declared
to be Hebrew. French, the language of instruction in the Alliance
schools in the Ottoman Empire for the past 60 years, was no longer a
possibility in the new Turkish state. Since Hebrew was not a living
language at the time, the Alliance schools could only choose Turkish
as the language of instruction. With this law, Turkey compelled the
Jews to place themselves within the framework of a national
identity-Turkish or Zionist-and closed down the possibility of a
transnational Jewish political identity. "Given the impossibility of
adopting Hebrew," wrote the Alliance director, the authorities knew
that the schools would have to "teach in the official language: that is
to say, Turkish."2 77 "The substitution of Turkish for the French
language," he concluded, "resulted with the destruction of the
homogeneity" of the Alliance's transnational form of identity. 27 8 The
Jewish community in Turkey took the only option available-the
adoption of Turkish as the language of instruction in the Alliance
schools. 279 This meant that the Alliance could no longer use its
traditional cadre of teachers, who were foreign to Turkey and did not
speak the language. 28 0 By the end of 1924, the Alliance schools used
Turkish as their language of instruction, were managed from Turkey,
YEARS: THE ADVENTURES OF TURKIFICATION 1923-1945] 42 (1999).
276. RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 171.

277. Id.
2 7 8. Id.
279. This section builds on Aron Rodrigue, From Millet to Minority: Turkish
Jewry, in PATHS OF EMANCIPATION: JEWS, STATES, AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note
67, at 238, 257-58.
280. See Moria Paz, The Rise and Fall of Ethnic Transnationalism: The Case of
the Alliance Israelite Universelle 56-117 (2007) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis,
Harvard University) (on file with American University International Law Review)
(discussing Alliance teachers, their selection, training, and geographical
circulation).
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and employed only Turkish teachers.
Furthermore, in 1925-26, non-Muslim groups in Turkey were
forced to renounce those clauses of the Lausanne Treaty which gave
them pockets of cultural autonomy. 28 1 As a result, the Jewish
community became a strictly voluntary confessional association
within Turkey, and no longer had the right to maintain its separate
private schools. Turkey granted the Jewish community five years to
complete the transition of its schools to state control. By 1929, the
Alliance schools had been totally nationalized and co-opted into the
state; the schools followed the state curriculum, with the exception of
a few hours devoted to Jewish religious studies.282 Education was
provided in Turkish and all teachers were Turkish citizens. Finally,
starting in 1931, no Turkish citizen was allowed to attend a foreign
elementary school. This gave birth to a unified national elementary
education system in Turkey, finalizing the state monopoly over
education.28 3
B. THE RISE OF ZIONISM AND THE DEMISE OF THE ALLIANCE
The Alliance was not only under attack from without, but it was
also losing support from within the Jewish community. The gradual
disenchantment with the Alliance and turn toward Zionism is
discussed in this section first through the personal view recorded by
Albert Memmi, an Alliance alumnus and prominent Sorbonneeducated sociologist, and second through an historical examination
of the encounter between the Alliance and Zionist leaders in
Versailles (1919).
While the Alliance called for Jewish assimilation into the larger
society, Memmi, who like the majority of Tunisian Jews, grew up in
the ghetto, found that Tunisian society denied its native Jews any
meaningful space for social inclusion. "Never, I repeat, never ... did
the Jews in Arab lands live in other than a humiliated state,
vulnerable and periodically mistreated and murdered, so that they

281. For a recounting of both why Turkish Jews were forced to renounce the
clauses of the Lausanne Treaty, which gave them pockets of cultural autonomy,
and how they became legally ineligible to educate their own people in Turkey, see
RODRIGUE, supra note 61, at 171.
282. Id. at 164.
2 83. Id.
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should clearly remember their place." 28 4
After independence, Jews could join the state as citizens, but the
nationalist atmosphere in Tunisia did not allow them any real
opportunities for participation in the political processes of the
country. In this reality of "emancipation without liberalization, "285
assimilation was impossible: "[I]n order to be assimilated it is not
enough to leave one's group," Memmi explained, "but one must

enter another." 28 6
The Alliance education had taught Memmi to think of himself as a
Frenchman. This education was so complete that he learned that
"[h]e and his land" were "nonentities or exist only with reference to
the Gauls, the Franks or the Marne."28 7 Even his "interior
monologues" were "in French" and when he spoke to himself "in
dialect" (Arabic) he always had "the strange impression . .. of

hearing an obscure and obsolete part of [him]self, so forgotten that it
[wa]s no longer native to [him]."28 8 Indeed his Alliance years taught
him that he, "the son of an Italian-Jewish father and a Berber
mother" 28 9 belonged "neither to [his] family nor to [his] religious
community"-he "was a new being, "290 and this new person was
French.
Yet, upon adulthood, Memmi discovered that France would not let
him in. Memmi's suspicion of France was ultimately confirmed by
the events of World War II:
Once I had overcome my rage against Vichy, the numerus clausus, and
the Fascist Legion, I began to doubt the treason of France. To accept it
would indeed have been unbearable. All my ambitions, my studies, and
my life were founded on this choice. How much would I have to uproot in
myself now? What would be left of me? It was in this dreadful moment
that I finally caught a glimpse of my ruin. If I rejected what I was
becoming would I be able to return to what I had been? 291

284. ALBERT MEMMI, WHO Is AN ARAB
285. Rodrigue, supra note 279, at 260.

JEW?

7 (1975).

286. MEMMI, supra note 113, at 124.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 105.
ALBERT MEMMI, THE PILLAR OF SALT

Id. at 113.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 315.

289 (1992).
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In the face of the exclusion from Tunisia and the abandonment by
France, Memmi discarded France: "I would never be a Westerner. I
rejected the West . .. I had rejected the East and had been rejected by

the West. What would I ever become? What was my future?" 29 2
For Memmi, this ambiguous identity entailed a "twofold liability,
a twofold rejection." 293 Indeed, there was no way out of "the split in
myself"29 4 -1he could not turn back to the traditional Jewish patterns
of identity, nor could he fully integrate into French or Tunisian life.
He, like other Jews of the Islamic world, was trapped in a social
order in which he had no place, in the "specific Jewish fate [that]
makes the Jew a minority being; different, separated both from
himself and from others; a being abused in his culture and in his
history, in his past and in his daily life-in the end, an abstract
being,"295 Memmi concluded that the "Jewish condition was an
impossible condition ... I define an impossible condition as a
condition which can have no solution in its actual structure."296
In this wilderness, Zionism promised the only way out and an
opportunity to enjoy a more complete life, to become a member of a
unified body with institutions, traditions, and narratives.
Since the nation is still the most effective historical form, the Jew must
adopt this form to rid himself of the oppression and live as a normal
people among other peoples. The nation is not a preliminary, it is an
ending . . . Only the territorial solution, a free people on a free territory - a

nation - is an adequate solution to the fundamental and specific
deficiencies in the Jewish condition .... 297

At the same time that Alliance students and alumni, like Memmi,
were increasingly turning to Zionism as a solution, the Alliance also
lost its legitimacy to represent world Jews at international gatherings.
This development is exemplified by the open conflict with the
Zionist movement that erupted on the eve of the Peace Conference in
1919. In Paris, the Zionists, themselves still a minority within the
292. Id. at 321.
293. Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction to MEMMI, supra note 113, at xxii.
294. MEMMI, supra note 284, at 30.
295. ALBERT MEMMI, PORTRAIT OF A JEW 320 (1962).

296. ALBERT MEMMI, THE
1966) (emphasis in original).
297. Id. at 288, 294.

LIBERATION OF THE JEW

263 (Judy Hyun trans.,
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Jewish people, attacked the Alliance for having no legitimacy within
the Jewish world to speak on their behalf. The Alliance was not a
democratic body; indeed the Secretary General of the Alliance,
Jacques Bigart, wrote: "We have never thought of instituting ... any
system of voting whatsoever."298 But by 1919, and after six decades
of advocating for the Jewish community,2 99 the oligarchic nature of
the Alliance was no longer perceived as legitimate within the Jewish
world. The Zionists argued that the Alliance was not accountable to
the masses of Jews and had no qualifications to represent the, Jews.
Indeed, Nahum Sokolov explained, "their credentials consist of their
election by the Jewries to which they belong."3 00
Most of the Zionist leaders-like the majority of world Jews in
1919-came from Eastern and Central Europe. They understood
themselves to be, and presented themselves to others as, a democratic
body that spoke "the mind of millions of Jews whom you will never
see and who cannot speak for themselves."3 0 ' Moreover, they were
the party "most nearly concerned" with the issue of minorities and
they approached the topic "with more knowledge" of what the
Jewish masses wanted.3 02 And what the Jews wanted was to be
recognized as an independent political entity. "The Jews," Chief
Rabbi Osias Thon, the Zionist leader from Krakow, declared, "are a
nation," not "a religious sect," or a cultural minority with private
rights within the framework of their territorial state.3 03 Moreover,
they also "wish the world to know it."304 At a raucous public meeting
between the two groups in 1919, Nahum Sokolov yelled that the days
of the "grand dukes" were over and "their charitable traditions were
no longer applicable."3 0 The Jewish masses, he concluded, were now
"in the saddle."3 0 6 Thon echoed Sokolov by looking at the Alliance
representatives and asking, "Why should we deal with the dead
elements?"3 07
298. JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 286.
299. Silberman, supra note 23, at 38.
300. LEVENE, supra note 152, at 270.
301. ANDELMAN, supranote 132, at 87 (quoting Weizmann).
302. JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 295.
303. Id. at 301.
304. Id.
305. LEVENE, supra note 152, at 269-270
306. Id. at 270.
307. JANOWSKY, supra note 125, at 294 n.35 (referring to the fact that the
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Despite the various forces driving world Jewry toward Zionism,
the Alliance continued to question the practicality of a territorial
solution. Indeed, the discussions between the Alliance and the
Zionists in the crucial moments at Versailles were extraordinarily
prescient. Lvi predicted that Zionism would be dangerous because
those who are seeking shelter in Palestine "come from countries
where they have been subjected to a treatment that one can only
describe as terrible" and as a result, they "carry passions which I
shall dare to describe as explosive, and which risk producing grave
troubles."3 08
Jacques Bigart continuously reminded the Zionist leaders of their
own blindness to the reality in Palestine. He prophesied that the
revival of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was not a sustainable
option, with the land being home to a native Muslim population and
Arab nationalism spreading across the Muslim world:
Palestine has fewer than 100,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs. The
government of the Entente pride themselves [sic] on allowing national
self-determination, is it allowable, under these conditions, to have the
majority governed by a small minority? ... They also say, "today we are
a minority," but in x years by means of immigration we shall be a
majority. Having regards to the Arab awakening to which the Entente
gives support, and which tomorrow perhaps will play an important role in
the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, is there not great danger in confronting it
with a politico-national "Judaism," the followers of which are recruited
abroad (and in what circles!)? This is the point of many Frenchmen who
are very favorable towards the Jewish elements but who, having studied
the Arab problem, observe an incompatibility between Zionist demands
and the ambitions of the prominent leaders of re-awakened Arabia. 309

At the same time, the Zionists accused the Alliance of being blind
to the mortal threat of European anti-Semitism. The Zionist leaders
predicted in 1919 that even if Jews obtained equal rights in their
states of residence, the Jewish question would remain "just as
burning"3 10 and the Alliance's political solution was not adequate to
Americans were no longer advocates of creating a Jewish nation but still attended
the meeting).
308. lB THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supra note 97, at 228.
309. Elie Kedourie, The Alliance Israelite Universelle, 1860-1960, 9 JEWISH J.
Soc. 92, 92-99 (1967).
310. Notes of Meeting Held on Thursday February 8th 1917 at the Residence of
Sir Mark Sykes, 9 Buckingham Gate, London, Eng. (Feb. 8, 1917) (on file with
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protect Jewish life. In ignoring the impossibility of a secure Jewish
life in Europe, the Zionists argued that the Alliance was betraying the
Jews spectacularly.3 1
A century later, we know that both the Alliance and the Zionists
were right. The Alliance correctly foresaw that Zionism would
condemn Jews to racial separation, not only splitting them off from
the rest of the world but also excluding Palestinian Arabs from the
benefits of the nation. Similarly, the Zionists were right to denounce
the Alliance for naYve faith in the protection afforded by European
states and for operating at times as an arm of French imperialism.
The network form did not offer an adequate solution for preserving
Jewish life, and its "universalism" was never fully differentiated
from colonialism. Neither the network nor the state form on its own
provided a sufficient solution for the challenges facing the Jews, and
in many ways the history of the struggle between these two
approaches is also the story of the predicament of our present nationstate system.

CONCLUSION
This article has used two intertwined stories to trace the evolution
of the transnational ethnic/religious network and its status under
international law. The examination of the Alliance was intended to
provide depth and meaning to the political potential of the network
form for organizing ethnic/religious identity. This work focused on
the capabilities inherent in education and suggested that the story of
the Alliance demonstrates how a people can mobilize control over a
network of minority schools to enact their political self. Not only do
the schools generate shared political orientations and particular codes
of participation, but they also are able to supply basic services akin
to those of a welfare state, acting in some ways as a surrogate
government within the community. The form of identity promoted by
the network is practiced in relationships which support and enable or
reject and impede external structures of authority, rather than being
based on territorial state institutions. The resulting community is
geographically disparate but culturally and politically coherent. For
the Alliance, the network structure was a conscious preference, not a
American University International Law Review).
311.

IB LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN, supranote 97, at 236.
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temporary or second-best pick. The choice of this form for the
organization of a group's political self challenges the assumption that
the territorial state is the intrinsic and natural inclination for all
ethnic/religious communities.
The story of the Alliance indicates that, despite widely held
assumptions to the contrary, networks are not a new phenomenon
emerging in our current era of globalization, but have in fact been
with us for over a century. It further suggests that existing
scholarship on networks has an overly narrow view of the
capabilities of the form. Scholars often assume that only the state
plays a role in "imagining" and constructing national-political
identity, but the case of the Alliance demonstrates that a network can
also be used to organize a people and to satisfy national or quasinational aspirations outside the frame of a territorial state. Moreover,
contemporary scholars of networks often presume that the rise of
networks indicates a disaggregation of state power, but this case
illustrates that the relationship between the network and the state can
be more complex and embedded. The two strategic modes of
organization can both support and compete with each other,
frequently at the same time, suggesting that neither form is wholly
independent of the other. This article argues that the ensuing
interaction is unstable and leads to unpredictable results: the
relationship transforms in time and space in response to external
developments.
Second, this work told the story of when and how statesmen,
international lawyers, scholars, and judges mobilized the language
and power of the law to explicitly exclude the transnational network
from legal status and political visibility on the international realm.
This split is not a deduction from natural principles, but rather was
invented by the policymakers and international experts who gathered
in Paris in 1919 and codified the two-sided legal regime of the
Minorities Treaties and the Peace Treaty. I analyzed the social,
cultural, and political contexts that informed their specific choices
and actions. The consolidation of a political system centered on
territoriality cast the network as politically deviant and obliterated
the complicated and intertwined relationship between the territorial
and the transnational modes of organization. This manufactured
dichotomy between the state and the network makes it difficult for us
today to understand either institution as a whole. My reading of
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history suggests that the common dictum that "states make the law"
is too simple: at Versailles in 1919 the converse was also true, as the
state emerged as the dominant political form in part as a result of the
international legal discourse of the time.
The legal regime for the international protection of minorities
established in 1919 was largely abandoned in the aftermath of the
Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1938-9, which was abetted by
the local German minority. Of the dual legal precepts enshrined at
Versailles, self-determination and minority rights, only selfdetermination survived in the post-war international legal order. The
Minorities scheme disappeared and gave way to doctrines and
institutions for the protection of individual human rights, most
notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).312 The
abandonment of the Minorities regime was also reflected in case law;
cases dealing with schooling as a collective right of minorities
appearing in front of the PCIJ gave way to cases concerning
education or religious freedom as individual rights, argued in front of
human rights bodies. The latter are narrower and more technical
cases that do not directly address the potential of education in nation
building.
Yet the Minorities protection regime remains embedded in our
international system. Indeed, the rights of minorities were never
legally repudiated; they have simply been largely ignored.
Conceptually, the international legal categories of identity that were
generated in 1919 still shape how we understand the players in
nationalistic conflicts to this day. In a series of articles, Nathaniel
Berman has described the "striking resurgence" of the notions of
"minority rights" since the fall of the former USSR and the
fracturing of Yugoslavia.3 13 This renewed interest in the legal
structure of the minority is evident in treaties such the 1991 Draft
312. Until the early 1990s, minorities survived in international law only as
undefined category "in the pallid Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights." Nathaniel Berman, The InternationalLaw of Nationalism: Group Identity
and Legal History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 25, 53 (David
Wippman ed., 1988). Interestingly, the Alliance played an important role also in
the lawmaking of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see Moria Paz, A
Non-TerritorialEthnic Network and the Making of Human Rights Law: The Case
of the Alliance Israeite Universelle, 4 INTERDISC. J. Humlv RTS. L. 1, 3, 23-25
(2010).
313. Berman, supra note 312, at 26.
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Convention on Yugoslavia, the 1995 Dayton Agreements on Bosnia,
and the 1995 European Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities.
The exclusion of the network from international legal personality
and the abortive effort to define a protected minority class within
state borders have left us without any legally-meaningful structures
that occupy the space between the state and the individual. Indeed,
even today, almost 100 years after the drafting of the Minorities
Treaties, we still lack both a precise legal definition of "minority"3 14
and an understanding of the relationship between a national minority
and a transnational ethnic or religious people. This void has
significant consequences. Without legal recognition of a national
stance outside statehood, the law is conceptually unable to grapple
with a transnational ethnic-religious people that organize themselves
as a political entity but that explicitly reject territorial content and
state institutions. The lack of this middle structure may push ethnicreligious people to take more extreme positions, either dropping out
completely from the existing international order or pursuing a
nationalist agenda and challenging the territorial status quo.
Neither the scholars nor the institutions of international law have
the legal language or conceptual tools needed to fully engage with
the problem posed today by violent transnational religious networks.
We have only the mechanisms of the state system-military forces
and criminal justice systems-but these approaches can be poorly
suited to the political challenge raised by such groups. And,
interestingly, concerns about education are once more at the
forefront, as many of these groups have some relationship to
schooling networks spread across state boundaries and have used
314. Indeed neither the United Nations Charter nor the 1948 Universal
Declaration on Human Rights includes reference to minorities. The only legally
binding text which refers specifically to minorities-albeit without' defining
them-is Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
rights. The Article provides general recognition of limited minority rights: "In
those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For more on the lack
of definition of a "minority," see Jelena Pejic, Minority Rights in International
Law, 19 HuM. RTs. Q. 666, 667-75 (1997).
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these schools as one mechanism for constructing and propagating
their network organization.
Both the recent return of the concepts behind the Minorities
regime and the renewed focus on cross-border networks of religious
education have left us grappling with many of the same issues that
were addressed, or ignored, in the PCIJ cases from the inter-war era.
It is therefore valuable to recover the history of that period and
examine its legacy. Perhaps the most significant lacuna in this
existing body of case law is the failure to recognize the limits of the
Minorities regime in resolving conflicts between the minority and the
state that are essentially political in nature. The principles of
''equilibrium" and of cultural freedom within the private sphere are
appealingly even-handed in the abstract, but it is seldom clear how
these general principles should be applied to real disagreements in
which the interests of each side come into a genuine conflict. Martti
Koskenniemi has written of a similar difficulty with the principle of
self-determination:
It is a paradoxical characteristic of a generally formulated right or a
principle such as "self-determination" that, stated in abstracto, seems to
convey a value that most people will immediately endorse. The more
concrete it is made, however-that is, the more it is applied as a right of
this or that entity-the more controversial it starts to appear, with the
result, finally, that it becomes useless when it seems most needed: in a
dispute about the boundaries of a particular "Self' against another. The
more, in other words, juristic discussion turns away from affirmations of
the abstract principle to particular cases of application, the more it seems
necessary to have recourse to an evaluation of the particular character or
practices of those communities (including their self-identification
principles and the manner in which they proceed to fulfill their goals)
whose boundaries have become overlapping. 315

I end the Article with two of the dissenting opinions from the PCIJ
cases, which highlight the difficulties inherent in this attempt to
formalize blanket minority protections within a system that is
fundamentally constructed on state sovereignty.
In its dissent in the Minorities School in Albania case, Sir Cecil
Hurst, Count Rostworowski, and M. Negulesco captured the flaw in
315. Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of
Legal Theory and Practice,43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 264 (1994).
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the decision's description of an idealized equilibrium in which the
minority and the majority pursue their separate cultural identities in
peaceful coexistence. They explained that the "elusive" "perfect
equilibrium"316 ignores a fundamental clash between two conflicting
principles:
[T]he question whether the possession of particular institutions may or
may not be important to the minority cannot constitute the decisive
consideration. There is another consideration entitled to equal weight.
That is the extent to which the monopoly over education may be of
importance to the State. The two considerations cannot be weighted one
against the other: neither of them-in the absence of a clear stipulation to
that effect - can provide an objective standard for determining which of
them is to prevail.317

For this judge, the resolution of conflict lies outside the realm of
the law: it must be reached through political, not legal, channels. He
suggests in this case an examination of the intention present at the
moment of signing the Minorities Treaties "representing the common
1
In every specific case, it is political
will of the parties.""'
ones,
that determine whether the minority or
not
legal
considerations,
majority triumph.
The dissent opinion in the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia
also despaired of finding legal solutions to conflict between minority
and majority interests. Judge M. Nyholm explained that since the
nature of the identity of the minority "cannot be disputed or verified'
by the host state, it "is entirely unimpeachable," "cannot be limited
by rules of law" and "comes solely within a moral sphere."3 19 Instead
of recourse to law in moments of conflict, we must resort to the
"good faith" of both the minority and the majority.3 20
As the legal notions first developed in the Minorities Treaties have
now returned to currency, the shortcomings revealed in the case law
316. Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. at 26-27.
317. Id. at 27.
318. Id. The dissent referred to the letter of Prime Minister Clemenceau
(mentioned earlier) explaining the intention of the Minorities Treaties in order to
argue that, in cases of a clash, the intention of the Treaty was to privilege the state
over the right of the minority.
319. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser
A), at 63 (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 66.
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of that era can provide valuable direction to those crafting new
policies today. In seeking to apply the framework of minority rights
to provide a workable political structure that can resolve tensions
between a state and a minority, it appears that we will need to
examine each case in its unique particularities and specific factual
context. For example, when dealing with a conflict involving
minority schools, it may be necessary to specify from the outset not
only the abstract legal principles of minority protection but also such
details as the structure and content of the curriculum and student
eligibility and requirements for attendance.
A larger lesson of the history recounted in this article is that
conflict between minorities and states on questions of identity and
autonomy is not always inevitable. The example of the Alliance
demonstrates the potential for minority groups to pursue their own
cultural and political ends through network entities in a fashion that
can interact in a supportive way with state structures. Such projects
can flourish in legal contexts that provide sufficient flexibility to
enable their operations, but they largely disappeared from view after
World War I as a result of rigid formalization of the international
legal system and aggressive nationalism within states. The loss of the
network mode as a recognized political form for ethnic/religious
groups has reduced the number of tools available to the international
community for meeting the needs of minority populations for
political advancement and socio-economic development.
Revisiting the historical trajectory of the relationship between
minorities and states can lead us to a better understanding of the
nature and operation of ethnic/religious networks, as well as the legal
and political choices which underlie and constrain our present system
of international law. As we seek now to build upon the conceptual
foundations we have inherited, the efforts of an earlier generation of
community leaders, statesmen, policy makers, and international legal
experts should both inspire us with their legal creativity and caution
us to the complexities of human identity.
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